Summary Report of the Peace Accords Matrix Project on the Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)

Matthew Hauenstein
Madhav Joshi
Jason Michael Quinn
About Peace Accords Matrix

The Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) is home to the largest existing collection of implementation data on intrastate peace agreements. Working at the nexus between research and practice, PAM is comprised of researchers and practitioners seeking to promote and facilitate a higher order of integration between these domains. PAM team members regularly provide research support to ongoing peace processes on issues of peace agreement design and implementation. The 2016 Colombia peace agreement gives the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies primary responsibility for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord through PAM.

Matthew Hauenstein (Ph.D.) is a postdoctoral research associate at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame.

Madhav Joshi (Ph.D.) is an associate research professor and associate director of the Peace Accords Matrix at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame.

Jason Michael Quinn (Ph.D.) is an associate research professor of the Peace Accords Matrix at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame.

Citing this report:

Questions and comments about this report can be directed to
Madhav Joshi (mjoshiz@nd.edu).

Disclaimer:
The PAM project and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies do not monitor the implementation of R-ARCSS in any official capacity.
Overview

This policy brief updates the Peace Accords Matrix’s previous report on the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The incumbent government of South Sudan and four opposition groups, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), signed R-ARCSS in September 2018. The Parties had previously negotiated the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) in 2015, but largely did not implement it before returning to war in 2016.

In May 2019, the Parties agreed to extend R-ARCSS’s initial implementation period until November 12th, 2019 in order to complete a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program and resolve the number of states and boundaries. Despite this, they made little progress on the DDR or other provisions of R-ARCSS during the extension. While the Parties have initiated a majority of pre-transition reforms, they have made only minor progress on most provisions.

The peace process is now at an important juncture, with the Parties committed to inaugurate a power sharing government on November 12th, 2019; however, the incumbent government and opposition continue to disagree over whether to delay forming the new government to allow for greater implementation of R-ARCSS. The major peace process stakeholders—including regional, international actors, and civil society organizations—that played key roles in the negotiation of the accord must put greater pressure on the parties to hold face-to-face meetings to identify solutions and restart implementation of the stalled processes.
Status of Agreement Implementation

Fourteen months into the implementation period, the Parties have made minimal progress implementing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Compared to other comprehensive peace agreements analyzed by the Kroc Institute in its Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) database, the South Sudan implementation process is losing momentum. Figure 1 shows the percentage of reforms the Parties have implemented per month since they signed the R-ARCSS in September 2018.¹ PAM analysts used two measures of implementation. The first, shown by the teal line, only includes provisions intended to be implemented during the agreement’s Pre-Transitional Period, which the Parties extended through November 2019. The purple dotted line shows the implementation of the entire accord. In general, progress was minimal for the pre-transition activities during the initial eight-month implementation period, stalling at 31%; and the overall implementation rate was even lower at 17% for the entire peace accord.

In early May 2019, all five parties agreed to extend the Pre-Transitional period until November 12, 2019. During the first four months of the extension, PAM analysts found little progress beyond the pre-May 2019 period. In September 2019, the Parties initiated implementation of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program, which is connected to the R-ARCSS’s police and military reform provisions. As of mid-October 2019, the Parties have implemented 44% of the pre-transition reforms and 25% of the overall reforms. However, overall the pace of reforms remains behind the average first year implementation rate for 34 Comprehensive Peace Agreements in the PAM database.

¹ The analysis uses data through October 18, 2019 for that month.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of pre-transition provisions from R-ARCSS at each level of implementation by month since September 2018. By mid-October 2019, only two of the fifteen provisions (13%) had been implemented in full: the ratification of R-ARCSS by the Transitional National Legislature and the reestablishment of monitoring bodies tasked with observing the implementation of the agreement and the ceasefire.
While only one of the fifteen provisions (7%) had no progress, twelve (80%) were at minimal or intermediate levels of implementation based on PAM methodology. A minimal level of progress means that implementation of the necessary reforms has begun, but at the current pace is unlikely to be completed within the next year.

Figure 3: R-ARCSS Provision Implementation by Chapter

A. Government

B. Security

C. Humanitarian

D. JMEC

E. Supremacy

Status of Agreement Implementation
Figure 3 breaks down implementation progress by chapter of R-ARCSS. As can be seen, most of the pre-transition provisions deal with security issues, including the DDR program, as well as military and police reform. Until October 2019, the Parties had not implemented a majority of these provisions. When the cantonment of South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) forces began in September 2019, PAM analysts coded the DDR process—as well as military and police reform—as minimally implemented, as no further progress was reported, except for some forces being screened for either referral to the DDR commission or integration into the new security forces.

After accounting for peace process activities taking place in South Sudan, implementation of the security provisions remains well behind the timeline envisioned in R-ARCSS, as well as the six-month agreement to extend the Pre-Transitional Period. Information regarding the implementation of security provisions coming from South Sudan suggests that a unified national army cannot be deployed prior to the scheduled end of the Pre-Transitional Period on November 12, as required by both R-ARCSS and the May 2019 extension agreement.

By comparing R-ARCSS to similar peace agreements in the PAM database, the possible long term outcomes in South Sudan of non-implementation become evident. PAM researchers identified eight agreements with first year implementation scores within a standard deviation of R-ARCSS’s October 2019 full implementation rate of 25%. Figure 4 shows the implementation progress of these eight agreements for ten years. The results show three different implementation paths. Two agreements, India’s 1993 Bodo Accord and Senegal’s 2004 General Agreement, remain stalled following poor first year scores.

---

3 One provision, the detailed timeline, is not specific to any chapter of R-ARCSS and is excluded from the figure. We code that provision as not initiated for the entire observation period, due to the delays in the implementation process.
year implementation. Three agreements—Nepal’s 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Philippines’ 1996 Mindanao Final Agreement and Lebanon’s 1989 Taif Accord—achieved moderate implementation rates between 59% and 72% after ten years. Finally, agreements in Guinea-Bissau, Papua New Guinea and Mali all achieved implementation rates above 80% after ten years of implementation. South Sudan’s peace agreement can still achieve a higher implementation success rate if key stakeholders make informed policy decisions. Below, we outline a few policy options that are based on comparative peace process experiences around the world.
South Sudan’s situation is unique, but when signatories run out of ideas and options and face obstacles in the implementation process, lessons and insights from other peace processes can be useful. In the previously mentioned cases, the signatories, when faced with difficulties, had face-to-face meetings to overcome differences. In Nepal, the government, political parties, and the Maoists disagreed on issues related to timing of the post-war elections, the number and boundaries of the states, and the reintegration of the rebel combatants. Yet they constantly met with each other to explore ideas and options, which ultimately helped them to achieve implementation of the peace accord. It takes time to solve problems, but face-to-face meetings also help repair relationships and build trust necessary for peacebuilding successes. In September 2019, President Salva Kiir and SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar had their first face-to-face meeting in Juba since celebrating the signing of R-ARCSS in October 2018.

Except for the ceasefire verification process (CTSAMVM) in South Sudan, local civil society organizations (CSOs) do not have a significant formal role in the implementation process. To sustain peace process momentum, CSOs and religious actors need to play a significant role. There is a need to engage youth, religious actors, women’s groups, and other relevant actors to build and sustain inclusive peacebuilding momentum from the bottom up. The parties also need to create a space where peace process experts can share findings useful for the South Sudanese peace process. They also need to invite technical expertise in areas that need support, such as the DDR process.
Regional actors need to remain seized of the implementation process in South Sudan. Regional countries played a significant role in negotiating the current agreement, and they have significant cultural, political and economic influence and leverage over the implementation process compared to other outside actors.

Donor countries like the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway and multilateral agencies can significantly influence the rate of implementation compliance from the signatories of the R-ARCSS by making their support conditional on the demonstrable commitment to peace. Implementation success is critical to secure peace and development in South Sudan. International actors can incentivize the signatories to implement the agreement.
Visit the Peace Accords Matrix at peaceaccords.nd.edu

Visit the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at kroc.nd.edu