Thank you for taking the time to read this paper. It stems from a larger book project on why, how, and when state actors impede negotiated settlements to religious civil wars. The broader project develops and tests the theory presented here (in abbreviated form) through across- and within-case comparisons of British counterinsurgency campaigns during the early post-war period – namely, Mandatory Palestine (1944-47), Cyprus (1955-59), and Kenya (1952-60).

This paper is an attempt to distill some of the main insights of the project and demonstrate their plausibility and usefulness in the case of the Cyprus Emergency. In other word, it's more a theory building paper than a theory testing one. To that end, I would particularly appreciate feedback on the following points:

1. How compelling is the logic of the argument? Would you appreciate a broader perspective on the relevant political psychology literature? Or, do you find it useful that I focus on a specific cognitive bias in this paper?
2. What evidence do you find most illustrative and/or compelling? The Cyprus book chapter includes many additional details. And, it would be helpful to know which type I might consider further incorporating into this paper.
3. What do you find least compelling about the case study? What evidence seems missing? What else would you like to see to convince you that religion, and not solely materialist concerns, is a reason for British intransigence?
4. How do you feel about a single-case study? Would you like to see the generalizability of the theory to other British cases or a more contemporary one?
5. What do you find least useful in the paper? In other words, what should be cut to make room for what is missing?

Any and all other comments and questions are, of course, very welcome!

Jason

Religion and Strategic Culture in British Counterinsurgency[1]

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Abstract: Why are religious civil wars so difficult to resolve peacefully? In this paper, I argue that states, not just insurgents, drive the intractability of religious conflicts. More specifically, I draw on insights from social psychology, along with religious and strategic studies, to develop and test a novel theoretical framework for why government officials refuse to compromise with opposition movements that mobilize along religious lines. The argument posits Western political and military elites share a secular strategic culture that heightens the correspondence between religious insurgents' behavior and motives. This cognitive bias leads decision makers to infer that religious guerrillas fight to radically alter the status quo, rather than protest unfavorable conditions, such as poverty or territorial occupation. Ultimately, government officials discount the efficacy of a negotiated settlement because they conclude their opponents will stop at nothing to achieve their objective. It is not that religious insurgents are necessarily unwilling to make concessions; it is that they cannot credibly do so. I test these claims through a within-case analysis of British counterinsurgency operations during the Cyprus Emergency (1955-59). My findings challenge the conventional wisdom that dissidents' spiritual beliefs alone drive disputes to endure longer and remain resistant to compromise. Looking only at rebel groups ignores an equally important set of actors who also make decisions about the value of continued fighting versus that of pursuing peace.

I. Introduction

Nothing seemed to go as planned in the capital of Cyprus on the night of February 29, 1956. British colonial officials ostensibly gathered with the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Archbishop Makarios III, to conclude a peace deal that would end eleven months of armed opposition to their rule of the island. While these bureaucrats hammered out the final details of a negotiated settlement in the sandstone halls of Government House, insurgent forces exploded 21 bombs across Nicosia.[2] British reaction was livid and the talks immediately abandoned. Soon thereafter, Makarios was deported and a radio broadcast from then-Governor John Harding announced that the Archbishop's absence would pave the way for "moderate politicians to come forward" and help end the conflict.[3]

It is tempting to conclude from the above description that blame for the failed peace talks lies with the Archbishop and the guerrilla organization he spearheaded, the *National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle* (EOKA).[4] In truth, the British never expected to reach a political settlement. The previous day, Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Alan Lennox-Boyd informed Prime Minister Anthony Eden that he saw no possibility of Makarios compromising.[5] He only planned to attend the meeting so that the British could later say they did everything possible to reach an agreement and, thus, win global support for their continued control of the island.

This chain of events in Cyprus flips a strongly held conventional wisdom that insurgents' beliefs and identities alone drive religious civil wars to endure longer and remain more resistant

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[2] David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 103.
[3] Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 119.
[4] This is a standard translation of the organization's full name, which in Greek was Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών.
[5] The National Archives (TNA) CO 926/549: Colonial Secretary to Eden, 28 Feb 1956.

to bargained solutions than other types of armed conflicts. Such a view is now commonplace among scholars and policymakers, and journalists. Studies pointing to the inflexibility of religious ideas and demands on the battlefield have, unsurprisingly, proliferated since September 11, 2001.[6] Policy analysts, in turn, frequently bemoan the obstinacy of religious opponents in contemporary conflicts – from ISIS and other Islamist groups in the Middle East to rebels with explicit Christian demands, such as the Lord's Resistance Army in East Africa or the National Liberation Front of Tripura in eastern India, to Buddhist-nationalists like the Arakan Army in Myanmar.[7]

Seldom do we consider the inverse: that state intransigence may also be a reason religious conflicts endure so long. Yet, the opening anecdote to this paper paints a more complicated relationship between religion and conflict intractability than is otherwise suggested by popular commentary and the extant scholarship. We have become accustomed to the idea that rebels are solely responsible for the protracted nature of religious conflicts. However, insurgent forces are never the only actors that decide whether to reach a bargained solution or continue fighting. Nor

[6] Scott Atran and Jeremy Ginges, "Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict," *Science* 336, no. 6083 (2012): 855–57.
Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri Zhukov, "Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucuses," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 109, No. 2 (2015): 222 – 238; Monica Duffy Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War," *Security Studies* Vol. 15, No. 1 (2006): 34-69; Mark Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
Scott Atran and Jeremy Ginges, "Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict," *Science* 336, no. 6083 (2012): 855–57; Michael C. Horowitz, "Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading," *International Security* 34, no. 2 (2009): 162–93; Isak Svensson, "Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 6 (2007): 930–49.
[7] For a summary of policymakers' concerns about religious violence, see Monica Duffy Toft, "Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War," *International Security* 31, no. 4 (2007): 97–131. Examples of these anxieties are well illustrated in Daniel Byman, "The State of Terror," *Slate*, June 13, 2014; Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," *The Atlantic*, March 2015. One ten-year U.S. State Department veteran summarized the problem of the increasingly central role of religion in the Syrian civil war as follows, "People hold onto religious fights longer than battles over land and water. It becomes existential and related to belief in a higher calling." See Daniel Burke, "Syria Explained: How It Became a Religious War," September 4, 2013,

are they the only ones to be influenced by the religious dynamics of conflict.[8] Looking at only one side of the battlefield oversimplifies the problem.

This paper seeks to correct for this bias by taking the literature on religion and conflict in a new direction. My central focus is on why government, not insurgent, forces serve as a critical barrier to religious conflict settlement. I draw on insights from social psychology, along with religious and strategic studies, to develop a novel theoretical framework for understanding the strategic preferences of states for religious conflict termination. My argument connects to a small, but growing, cohort of scholars interested in how the religious characteristics of dissenters affect state response. Contemporary analyses focus on the objective threat religious groups pose to political elites.[9] I, instead, draw attention to how attitudes about religious violence, regardless of its real-world consequences, can explain the reluctance of states to bargain with religious rebels.[10]

In brief, I argue that Western political and military elites share a secular strategic culture that heightens the correspondence between religious insurgents' behavior and motives. This

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[8] Modern militaries are often portrayed as secular institutions; however, numerous studies have illustrated the subtle influence of religious beliefs, practices, and symbols on professional soldiers. See Ron E. Hassner, *Religion on the Battlefield* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); Ron E. Hassner, ed., *Religion in the Military Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Anne Loveland, *Change and Conflict in the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps since 1945* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2014); Doris L. Bergen, ed., *Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to the Twenty-First Century* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).

[9] Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, "A House Divided Threat Perception, Military Factionalism, and Repression in Africa," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2016, 0022002715620473; Nukhet Sandal and Jonathan Fox, *Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities* (New York: Routledge, 2013).Ani Sarkissian, *The Varieties of Religious Repression: Why Governments Restrict Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Peter S. Henne and Jason Klocek, "Taming the Gods: How Religious Conflict Shapes State Repression," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, September 27, 2017, Advanced Online Publication https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717728104; Toft, "Getting Religion?"

[10] My argument is also in line with social movement scholars who have persuasively shown that the identity of dissenters can substantially affect the type and extent of force applied by governments. The primary focus of this scholarship, particularly in recent years, has been the racial identity of protestors. See Christian Davenport, Sarah A. Soule, and David A. Armstrong, "Protesting While Black? The Differential Policing of American Activism, 1960 to 1990," *American Sociological Review* 76, no. 1 (2011): 152–78; Sarah Soule and Christian Davenport, "Velvet Glove, Iron Fist, or Even Hand? Protest Policing in the United States, 1960-1990," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (2009): 1–22.

cognitive bias leads decision makers to infer that religious guerrillas fight to radically alter the status quo, rather than protest unfavorable conditions, such as poverty or territorial occupation. Ultimately, government officials discount the efficacy of a negotiated settlement because they conclude their opponents will stop at nothing to achieve their objective. It is not that religious insurgents are necessarily unwilling to make concessions; it is that they cannot credibly do so.

I illustrate the usefulness of my framework through a within-case analysis of British counterinsurgency operations during the Cyprus Emergency (1955-59). I draw on original data collected during eight months of archival research in the United Kingdom and Cyprus to show that British officials played as much, if not more, of a role as insurgents in undermining bargaining efforts to resolve that conflict.

Understanding how religion contributes to the intractability of armed conflict is a particularly pressing issue today. Nearly half of all civil wars during the twenty-first century have been fought over confessional differences or for religious demands.[11] And, these conflicts have been found to endure longer and remain more difficult to resolve peacefully than other types of political violence.[12]

The argument I propose, consequently, has important implications for how states can better respond to this challenge. In addition, my argument and findings represent a significant departure from the conventional literature on religious conflict in two important ways. First, they shift our analytical lens away from the beliefs of rebels to the perceptions of counterinsurgent forces. The former is, of course, an important topic of study. But, the rush to comprehend insurgents' seemingly irrational motivations has been at the expense of better understanding

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[11] Monica Duffy Toft, "Religious Civil Wars: Nasty, Brutish, and Long," in *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*, ed. Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 147–73.

[12] Svensson, "Fighting with Faith."; Monica Duffy Toft, "Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War," *International Security* 31, no. 4 (2007): 97–131., 116.

what drives more traditional political and military elites. This study provides the first theoretical explanation and empirical test of this latter topic.

Second, my analysis underscores the need to treat religion as more than merely an objective category that can be easily identified, measured, and compared across diverse settings. Religion, similar to most concepts of interest to social scientists, is socially constructed.[13] We, therefore, need to remain sensitive to how specific political actors themselves construe religious and secular phenomena at particular points in history and how these interpretations, in turn, impact conflict outcomes. A few recent analyses that adopt a phenomenological approach are sensitive to how religious adherents construe their beliefs and practices.[14] Less attention, however, has been given to how state actors think about religion.

The remainder of this paper proceeds in four parts. In the first, I outline the current consensus for how rebels' religious beliefs drive conflict intractability. In the second section, I elaborate on my alternative argument for why states also play a critical role in inhibiting the peaceful resolution of religious conflicts. In the third section, I apply this framework to a case study of the Cyprus Emergency. I consider the broader implications of this study in the fourth, and concluding, section.

II. The Conventional Wisdom on Religion and Conflict Intractability

The conventional wisdom identifies two main pathways through which religion might make armed conflicts more intractable. In short, religion could provide rebels the means or the motivation for continuing a struggle longer than they otherwise might.

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[13] William T. Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[14] Ron E. Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

First, spiritual (especially extremist) beliefs and practices might offer significant organizational advantages. These benefits can, for example, help rebel leaders overcome traditional principal-agent problems by screening out less committed soldiers.[15] Many religious rebels that draw on extremist ideologies require high personal sacrifice for membership, such as renouncing friends and family that do not share the same beliefs. These groups are also inclined to appeal to ideologues in the population that have more to gain from fighting. Moreover, religious groups might have an additional advantage when it comes to screening potential recruits given their large social networks.[16]

Once members join, religious ideas and practices can further align principal and agent preferences in a number of ways. The incorporation of religious rituals can be a particularly powerful set of tools for inculcating beliefs and internalizing a movement's cause.[17] A sense of moral supremacy might also align leader and insurgent interests and make combatants less likely to question the legitimacy of their cause, even in the face of significant setbacks.[18]

Religious ideas and identities might also offer inexpensive, but evocative, rewards and punishments to maintain membership over time. Traditionally, rebel leaders persuade their members to incur the high costs of fighting, especially in the face of setbacks, through private,

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[15] Eli Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model," *Journal of Public Economics* 92, no. 10 (2008): 1942–67; Rodney Stark, "Why Religious Movements Succeed or Fail: A Revised General Model," *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 11, no. 2 (1996): 133–46.

[16] Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, "Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and Sects," American Journal of Sociology 85 (1980): 1376–95.

[17] Dominic Johnson, "Gods of War: The Adaptive Logic of Religious Conflict," in *The Evolution of Religion: Studies, Theories, and Critiques*, eds. Joseph Bulbulia et al. (Santa Margarita, CA: Collins Foundation Press, 2008), 111–17; Roos Haer, Lilli Banholzer, and Verena Ertl, "Create Compliance and Cohesion: How Rebel Organizations Manage to Survive," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 3 (2011): 415–34; Emil Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, *The Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and Jihadists: Why Ex-Militants Choose to Abandon Violence in the North Caucasus* (New York: Palgrave, 2014); John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements* (Routledge, 2009).

[18] Richard Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

material rewards. But religious groups have a range of other options. Eli Berman, for example,

argues that radical religious groups are particularly good at limiting defections because they

require high personal sacrifice, provide essential social services, and cut members off from

alternative social networks.[19] Scott Gates and Ragnhild Nordås, in turn, note that the perceived

probability of reprimand for disobeying or defecting from a religious cause is likely to be

substantially higher in groups that trust retribution is in the hands of God than in movements

where punishment is managed by a worldly source.[20] The threat of such a punishment is not only

costless to enforce, but also impossible to escape.[21]

Second, analysts have worried that religious conflicts are more intractable because rebels

in these disputes often fight for intangible benefits. Classic bargaining models of warfare

envision rational actors that make decisions about the value of continued fighting versus a

negotiated peace based on tangible costs and benefits. Religious adherents complicate this

model, it is argued, because they pursue goals that either cannot be shared in this world or only

fully realized in the next.

Many religious conflicts, for instance, are fought over indivisible issues. These are

objectives that cannot be easily divided or substituted without losing their subjective value.

Sacred space is the most common example.[22] It represents a unique link between the believer and

the supernatural. This core function transforms and reinforces sacred sites as places set apart

from and contrasted with the profane. Consequently, any act that blurs this distinction is an act of

desecration and diminishes the value of the resource. In addition, sacred sites are not easily

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[19] Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent*; Berman and Laitin, "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods."
[20] The cScott Gates and Ragnhild Nordås, "Recruitment, Retention, and Religion in Rebel Groups," *Simsons Papers in Security Development* 32 (2014).
[21] Barbara F. Walter, "The Extremist's Advantage in Civil Wars," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 7–39.
[22] Ron E. Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Ron E. Hassner, "To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility," *Security Studies* 12, no. 4 (2003): 1–33; Stacie E. Goddard, "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy," *International Organization* 60, no. 01 (2006): 35–68.

replaced because they represent distinct moments in a faith community's history that cannot be found elsewhere or reproduced.[23]

Indivisible issues can also refer to more than territory. Conflicts for control of the country, including its legal system, might also take on these subjective values. For instance, there is only one constitution in a state, which can either be secular or religious, but not both simultaneously.[24] Typical ways to deal with indivisibility, such as side payments, are less helpful for these issues because religious rebels see any compromise between spiritual and political matters as capitulation to a secularist point of view.[25]

In addition to indivisibility, religious rebels might be less likely to make concessions during civil wars because they enjoy longer time horizons than their secular counterparts. This mechanism suggests that adherents of a faith tradition do not fear death because of beliefs in the afterlife.[26] Rather, it is to be welcomed as a reward for a life well lived or a sacred duty performed.

These ideas, ultimately, increase the willingness of religious insurgents to forgo material gains in the present for spiritual rewards in the future. They are able to absorb more costs during a conflict and, consequently, make fewer concessions, even in the face of significant setbacks or diminishing economic returns.[27] Discounting present costs for future benefits is, for instance, one

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[23] Larger territorial units, including entire regions of a state or the state itself, can also take on these properties, especially when a "homeland" becomes an integral attribute of a group's identity. See Monica Duffy Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War," *Security Studies* 15, no. 1 (2006): 34–69. See also Goddard, "Uncommon Ground."

[24] Isak Svensson, "Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 6 (2007): 930–49; Isak Svensson, *Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars* (Brisbane, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 2013).

[25] For example, there is a high audience cost to insurgent leaders that try to negotiate on religious ideas they may have once fueled. See Isak Svensson and Emily Harding, "How Holy Wars End: Exploring the Termination Patterns of Conflicts with Religious Dimensions in Asia," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23, no. 2 (2011): 133–49; Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).

[26] Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War."

[27] Mark Juergensmeyer similarly notes that religious fundamentalists often view a conflict in terms of sacred or

reason often cited for why the Crusaders continued their campaigns long after the material costs exceeded the benefits.[28] Jessica Stern presents a similar argument for contemporary suicide bombing campaigns. She argues that religious extremist groups, such as Hamas, train their attackers to value the expected benefits of an eternal life over those of the present.[29]

To summarize, the conventional wisdom points to two main pathways through which religion might make armed conflicts more intractable. The means mechanism suggests that religious rebels enjoy distinct organizational advantages that increase their cohesion and resolve. Shared commitments and incentives drive members that join such groups to remain loyal and dedicated to the organization over time. The motivations mechanism, in turn, suggests that the bargaining range of belligerents is significantly minimized when rebels frame and perceive their claims in religious terms.[30] The increased, subjective value of territory or other goals makes compromise less likely. And, longer time horizons shift individual-level calculations about the utility gained from continued fighting versus surrender.

In line with this conventional wisdom, the extant scholarship has largely coalesced around demonstrating the link between the religious beliefs of insurgents and conflict tractability. This research relies heavily on cross-national, quantitative analyses to demonstrate a correlational relationship. According to several recent studies, for example, twentieth century civil wars in which combatants make religious demands have been nearly three times less likely

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divine time, which reduces their willingness to compromise their goals in the short term. See Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*.

[28] Michael C. Horowitz, "Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading," *International Security* 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 162–93.

[29] Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 2004), 51. Monica Toft has made a similar point about Chechen rebels during the Beslan school siege in September of 2004. See Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War."

[30] Jonathan Fox, "The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 6 (2004): 715–31.

to end through a peace agreement than other internal wars and nearly twice as likely to recur.[31] They have also been found to endure, on average, two years longer than their nonreligious counterparts.[32]

The extant scholarship, then, points to a clear link between religion and conflict intractability. However, the reason for this relationship remains unclear. The means and motivation mechanisms are often asserted, but rarely tested. Indeed, some analyses explicitly acknowledge that they cannot discriminate between competing causal pathways in their research design.[33] Moreover, because existing studies focus only on the organization and goals of insurgents, they overlook the role state forces might play in obstructing the peaceful resolution of religious conflicts. These limitations highlight the need for additional study of the link between religion and conflict intractability.

In the following section, I consider why states might play an equally important role in obstructing the peaceful resolution of religious civil wars. My argument emphasizes what we already know about civil wars more broadly – that conflict outcomes depend on the preferences and behavior of actors on both sides of the battlefield.

III. Why States Refuse to Compromise with Religious Insurgents

This section develops an explanation for the intractability of religious conflicts that emphasizes the role state forces play in obstructing the peaceful resolution of religious civil wars. A shift in focus from insurgent to counterinsurgent motivations during religious conflict raises two central questions. How do military and political elites construe religious opposition? How do these core assumptions about religious insurgents influence elites' strategic preferences?

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[31] Svensson, "Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars"; Toft, "Getting Religion?", 116.
[32] Toft, "Getting Religion?", 116.
[33] Svensson, "Fighting with Faith", p. 943.

Drawing on insights from social psychology, along with the strategic and religious studies literatures, I advance a theoretical framework that addresses both of these issues.

III.A. High Correspondence of Religious Violence

The starting point of my argument is that religious violence has high correspondence for Western security communities due to their strategic cultures. High correspondence refers to a tendency to see religious insurgents as driven by their internal convictions, rather than situational factors. Western policymakers do not believe that religious insurgents fight to protest unfavorable conditions, even when that is a group's explicitly stated objective. Instead, they infer from the characteristics and consequences of religious violence that insurgents are deeply committed to their cause and will stop at nothing to overthrow the status quo. The remarks of President George W. Bush shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001 provide a striking illustration of this propensity. During a NATO summit on combatting terrorism just two months after 9/11, he claimed "We have seen these terrorists in the nature of their attacks – they kill thousands of innocent people and then rejoice about it."[34]

The idea that policymakers infer the motives of religious insurgents directly from their behavior is grounded in what social psychologists refer to as correspondent inference theory. Edward E. Jones and Keith E. Davis first developed this framework in the 1960s to explain how observers interpret the goals of actors from their actions. These scholars were particularly interested in what determines and observer to ascribe internal rather than external attributions to another's actions. The former assigns the cause of a behavior to personal dispositions or characteristics; whereas, the latter sees behavior as driven by conditions or events outside a person's control.

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[34] Bin Laden, at first, denied responsibility for the attacks. In later public statements, however, his statements align with a relatively stable set of policy objectives by al-Qaeda – the removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia and an end to U.S. support for Israel. Policymakers, however, inferred larger motives.

Jones, Davis, and their colleagues labeled the perceived congruence between observed

behavior and inferred motive as the *level of correspondence,* or the "attribute-effect linkage".[35]

And, they identified three factors that heighten this connection and drive an observer to presume

the objectives of another are embedded in their actions, rather than the result of external

circumstances.[36] An action is determined to have high correspondence when it is freely chosen,

deviates from societal expectations, and causes personal harm to the perceiver. Activities that are

imposed on others, in line with social norms, and do not lead to individual harm have lower

correspondence.

Despite presenting an intuitive and concise model, correspondent inference theory is not

well integrated into the study of military decision making. Political scientists occasionally draw

on the general domain of attribution theory, but few scholars expressly consider the framework

developed by Jones and Davis. The one notable exception is a 2006 study by Max Abrahms on

why terrorist groups that target civilians, rather than military personnel and bases, are unable to

achieve their policy objectives.[37] I build on Abrahms' approach to show that religious violence

also has high correspondence for contemporary policymakers. Why might this be the case?

I argue the high correspondence of religious violence is the result of secular biases

embedded in Western security communities' strategic cultures. Strategic culture refers to the

shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common historical experiences

and societal norms, that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which

determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.[38] It consists of patterns

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[35] Kathleen S. Crittenden, "Sociological Aspects of Attribution," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9, no. 1 (August 1, 1983): 425–46.
[36] Jones and Davis, "From Acts: To Dispositions: The Attribution Process In Person Perception," 264.
[37] Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (October 1, 2006): 42–78.
[38] Kerry M. Kartchner, Summary Report of the "Comparative Strategic Culture: Phase II Kickoff Workshop," Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (Washington, DC: February 13, 2006).

of thought or behavior that organize categories of information and the relationships among them.[39] These mental structures ultimately serve to reduce uncertainty about the strategic environment.

Analysts generally argue that states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of domestic populations and elites.[40] I agree with this starting point for the source of strategic culture. Shared assumptions about religious violence embedded in states' strategic cultures are a product of their historical experience and prevailing social norms. However, I argue that there will be consistency, rather than variation, across Western states when it comes to the way they infer motives of religious insurgents from their actions for two primary reasons.

The first is because of a general secular bias that emerged out of the formative period of the modern state system. The Peace of Westphalia brought an end to more than a century of religious violence in Europe and initiated a system in which the institutional differentiation of religion and state is a central characteristic of political units. The central point here is not that the end of the Thirty Years' War ushered in a period of declining religious belief. Rather, the pivotal change is the shift of authority from religious institutions to non-ecclesiastical authorities. This gradually led to the differentiation of a secular sphere of political activity, while religion became steadily more privatized. While this process unfolded in different ways in different parts of

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[39] This conceptualization is in line with Alistair Ian Johnston's definition of strategic culture as a system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, biases) and what psychologists refer to as cognitive schemata. SeeAlastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64. Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," *Annual Review of Sociology* 23, no. 1 (August 1, 1997): 263–87.
[40] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 22; Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, MD: University Press Of America, 1986); Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 87–113.

Europe, they all converged to a similar terminal point.[41] The idea that religion and politics do not

mix well became enshrined in institutional arrangements that emerged out of mid-17th century

Europe. In this way, the Peace of Westphalia stands out as a critical juncture that has shaped

security policies towards religion in a path dependent way.[42] This process was most salient and

influential in the West.

Prevailing social and cultural forces are a second influence on Western decision makers'

shared views of religious violence.[43] This is because elites are trained in this context and, thus,

shaped by societal norms. In most Western states this means exposure to what religious studies

scholars call "the myth of religious violence".[44] This shared understanding is defined as a

founding and pervasive assumption of the modern state system that portrays religion as an

inherently destructive and irrational force that must be tamed in order to preserve social

harmony. It arose because political elites found religion to be a convenient stock character to

construe as the enemy of contemporary political order. It has proven to be an extraordinarily

pervasive story in Western culture and now underlies many of the core institutions of modern

states precisely because it is so useful.[45] For example, it is easy to observe in recent public

debates about the use of force against Islamist terror groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Insurgent violence is portrayed as distinctively disruptive, divisive, and dangerous; state violence

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[41] Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[42] This claim is in line with a model of decision making developed by Thomas Banchoff to explain consistency in Germany foreign policy in the post-War era. See Thomas Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999): 2.

[43] Thomas Berger, for example, has shown how Japanese and German cultural beliefs and values acted as a distinct national lens during the post-war period. Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

[44] William T. Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Karen Armstrong, *Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence* (New York: Knopf, 2014).

[45] For example, it has frequently been invoked by the U.S. Supreme Court to justify decisions on the Establishment Clause since the 1940s. See Cavanaugh, "They Myth of Religious Violence," 119.

appears justified and necessary. And, comparisons to past religious conflict in Europe often accompany these analyses.[46]

In sum, Western security communities' views of religion are shaped by both shared historical experience and prevailing social norms. For these reasons, decision makers share secular assumptions, despite other differences in their historical experience, regime type, economic development, or geography. And, these ideas increase the perceived level of correspondence for religious violence because they portray religion as a private, freely chosen human activity. Moreover, the mixing of religion and politics, rather than religion itself, is seen as especially uncommon and undesirable. These characteristics are precisely what correlate with what the literature in social psychology suggests determines an actions level of correspondence. And, as I outline in the following sub-section, they ultimately militate against compromise because they shift elites' strategic preference towards coercion and away from negotiation.

III.B. State Obstruction to Religious Conflict Resolution

The second part of my argument presents a new twist to the consensus view that envisions a direct relationship between the religious characteristics of insurgents and termination patterns. As discussed above, the conventional wisdom asserts that religious civil wars do not reach a negotiated settlement because insurgents refuse to compromise.

In contrast, I contend that government elites construe religious insurgents in the ways predicted by traditional models, regardless of whether this is actually the case. This is due to the inferences they draw based on the high level of correspondence of religious violence. And, it

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[46] Frank G. Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency," *Parameters: U.S. Army War College* 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 71–87; Edward Luttwak, "Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice," *Harper's Magazine* 2 (February 2007): 33–42; David J. Morris, "The Big Suck: Notes from the Jarhead Underground," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 83, no. 1 (2007): 144.

militates against compromise because government and military decision makers discount their opponents' willingness to compromise. The logic is as follows.

First, the actual aim of an insurgent group is not important. For analytic simplicity, we can assume a continuum of group objectives that fall between the terminal ends of either limited or maximalist aims. In line with the international mediation literature, I define the former as demands over territory or other material (i.e., natural) resources. Maximalist objectives, in contrast, refer to ideological demands. In particular, these denote goals to overthrow the status quo by either radically altering the political system (e.g., Communist reforms or Shari'a law) and/or upending societal values.

What is important is whether political authorities determine a group to employ religious violence, in whole or in part, or not. Due to the above-mentioned secular biases, policy makers construe religious violence in much the same way conflict scholars study the phenomenon.[47] The category of religion includes primarily those traditions that scholars have labeled "world religions". And, the focus is on observable characteristics that distinguish activity that draws inspirations from these faith traditions. Most notably, this involves mobilization and objectives.[48]

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[47] Theoretically, different states may call different things religious. As Elizabeth Shakman Hurd compellingly argues, the religious-secular distinction is "highly politicized, inflected with power relations, and historically variable." While religion is socially constructed, I argue that contemporary policy makers share a common conceptualization. See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Beyond Religious Freedom: An Introduction," The Immanent Frame, March 17, 2016, https://tif.ssrc.org/2016/03/17/beyond-religious-freedom-an-introduction/.

[48] The former can include combatant groups mobilizing supporters along religious lines, such as by making promises or appeals to shared religious identities or beliefs, using religious symbols and rhetoric to promote a cause, recruitment, or attempts to recruit, from sacred spaces (e.g., mosques, churches, temples), or targeting attacks against other faith communities to exacerbate divisions. For example the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) used a mixed strategy of payments and calls to jihad to enlist disenfranchised youth during the Algerian civil war. Religious objectives typically consist of announced aspirations to create a state, or a region within the state, ruled according to a specific religious tradition. Examples include the Forces of the Caucasus Emirates, which pursued their stated goal of creating an Islamic state in the region, and the Lord's Resistance Army, which announced an objective to create a theocratic state in Uganda based on the Ten Commandment.

Second, once an insurgent group is construed as religious, correspondence bias leads military and political elites to fixate on the short-term consequences of their opponent's actions. This means that officials will focus more on the death and destruction of an attack by religious insurgents than on what an attack might be trying to accomplish long term. Violence is seen as an end in itself, rather than a means. For example, following al-Qaeda's August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, U.S. leaders emphasized the bloodshed and destruction. They also inferred that these attacks were a direct assault on the West. However, "not in a single press statement, press conference, or interview did a U.S. leader or diplomat explain why the enemies of America hate America."[49] Similarly, following a spate of attacks by Chechen guerrillas in Russia in the late 1990s, the government focused on the damage and disruption caused by the bombings. Little time was spent considering the motives behind the bombings.[50]

This is an especially important point in light of recent findings in the literature on religious conflict. A number of studies find that religious civil wars are especially destructive and lethal. Most notably, a higher number of combatant and non-combatants deaths have been reported in religious civil wars compared to other types of armed conflict.[51] What has not been shown, however, is which side is responsible for these losses. My argument suggests that states will also not try to discern responsibility. Even if religious groups ramp up their violence in response to state repression, governments will focus on the effect of this relationship only. This is because they infer a direct relationship between religious groups' motives and actions.

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[49] Robert Fisk, "As My Grocer Said: Thank You Mr. Clinton for the Fine Words .. .," Independent (London), August 22, 1998, p. 3.
[50] See Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 63.
[51] See Pearce, "Religious Rage;" Toft, "Getting Religion?".

Third, military and political elites infer that religious insurgents have maximalist objectives, even when their explicitly stated objectives are otherwise. Because government and military decision makers infer the motives of religious insurgents from their behaviour, they don't take their opponent's stated objectives seriously. Instead, they believe that religious groups will not stop fighting until they radically alter the status quo.

Consider, for instance, that al-Qaida spokesmen have consistently maintained for almost two decades that the group's terrorist acts against the United States are intended to persuade American officials to withdrawal troops from Saudi Arabia, terminate military interventions that lead to Muslim deaths (i.e., Chechnya, Bosnia, East Timor, and Israel), and end support for pro-Western Muslim regimes that suppress local populations (i.e., Saudi Arabia and Pakistan).[52] Bin Laden himself explicitly rejected on several occasions the claim that al-Qaida's goal is to directly challenge or overturn American values.[53] Yet, this is precisely the inference political elites draw from al-Qaeda attacks. Despite a vociferous and consistent message to the contrary, al-Qaeda is understood to have maximalist aims that seeks to overturn Western values. The same is true for other religious insurgent groups.[54] And, while it is certainly the case that governments sometimes frame insurgents as more dangerous than they really are for instrumental reasons that is not the only reason policymakers reach such conclusions. Strongly held cognitive biases also lead them to overestimate the aggression and underestimate the willingness of religious insurgents to compromise.

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[52] See Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work.".

[53] "Bin Laden: 'Your Security Is in Your Own Hands,'" October 30, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/29/bin.laden.transcript/.

[54] Even when rebel groups do have stated religious objectives limited to a particular region, it is often suspected that they really want to impose their views on the entirety of the state. Abu Sayyaf in the Southern Philippines, for example, explicitly claims they are fighting to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Yet, the Philippine government, especially under Duterte consistently portrays the group as trying to destroy the entire country See "Philippines' Duterte Tells Army Destroy Militants or Risk Islamic State 'Disease,'" *Reuters*, August 10, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-militants/philippines-duterte-tells-army-destroy-militants-or-risk-islamic-state-disease-idUSKCN10L15N.

Fourth, and finally, military and political elites are less likely to compromise due to the above inferences. This may be for several reasons, although the central point is that states are reluctant to compromise with groups fighting for maximalist objectives.[55] It is harder to reach a mutually acceptable resolution when the perceived incompatibility challenges the values and order of a society, rather than just territorial boundaries. This may be because authorities maintain a normative commitment to the political and social system they govern. They are, therefore, unwilling to compromise over these deeply held positions. Another, more cynical, reason may be that ruling regimes will be unlikely to remain in power if the status quo is overturned. Even compromises that limit the change to a particular geographic region may either inspire future unrest by other groups or undermine support by domestic populations.

Most importantly for my argument, a state's strategic culture shapes perceptions of which strategic options are the most efficacious for dealing with religious opponents. This includes ideas about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the conditions under which applied force is useful. The view of religious rebels as unreasonable and aggressive severely restricts which policy options appear most efficacious for responding.

Typically a state's repertoire consists of options ranging from compromise to coercion to brute force. The inference that religious insurgents have maximalist objectives casts strong doubt on the efficacy of the first two options. Since rebels in these environments are construed as

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[55] The idea that authorities will resist compromise with groups fighting to overthrow the status quo is well supported in the bargaining literature. Empirical research on interstate bargaining, for instance, has demonstrated that territorial conflicts are more likely to be peacefully resolved than ideological conflicts. See Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (February 1, 1991): 7–17; Daniel Druckman, Benjamin J. Broome, and Susan H. Korper, "Value Differences and Conflict Resolution: Faciliation or Delinking?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, no. 3 (September 1, 1988): 489–510.; Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 4 (December 1, 1993): 670–91. Similar findings can be found in the civil war literature. See Jacob Bercovitch and Karl DeRouen, "Managing Ethnic Civil Wars: Assessing the Determinants of Successful Mediation," *Civil Wars* 7, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 98–116.

aggressive and uncompromising, they are seen as less likely to be persuaded by incentives that will allow them to only partially achieve their objectives or disincentives that might threaten their well being. Religious rebels, it is believed, will not bargain nor change their behavior based on increased hardships on the battlefield. So, not only do state decision makers have disincentives to compromise, they may also doubt the willingness of their opponent to do so.

To summarize, religious violence obscures a group's policy objectives in such a way that it minimizes the likelihood of reaching a bargained solution with the state. Governments do not believe religious insurgents fight to protest unfavorable conditions, such as poverty or territorial occupation. Rather, they infer religious insurgents seek to overturn the status quo from their behavior. This decision making process is shaped by a secular strategic culture that involves a heightened correspondence between religious insurgents' behavior and motives. And, it ultimately militates against compromise because political and military elites discount the efficacy of a negotiated settlement. It is not that religious insurgents are necessarily unwilling to make concessions; it is that they cannot credibly do so.

IV. Empirics: Cyprus Emergency (1955 – 59)

To demonstrate the empirical utility of my proposed framework, I analyze British response to the National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle, or EOKA, during the Cyprus Emergency. Exploiting cross-temporal variation, I show that British threat perceptions increased and the value attributed to negotiation efforts decreased as security forces came to recognize the critical role of religion in the rebellion. My analysis draws extensively on primary documents from the colonial archives in the United Kingdom and Cyprus. The majority of this information – which includes tactical incident reports, operational assessments, and personnel correspondences – comes from the War, Foreign, and Colonial Office files housed at The National Archives in

London.[56] I also reviewed those documents that were part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's "migrated archive", which have only been available to the public since 2013. Finally, documents from a number of other repositories in the United Kingdom and the Cypriot State Archives provided additional background context.[57]

At first glance, the case of Cyprus may seem an odd choice since a peace agreement (the London-Zurich Agreement) resolved the conflict. However, it is an especially useful case for understanding how military decision makers construe and combat religious opponents for four reasons. First, the case resembles contemporary religious conflicts in a number of substantial ways. The British battled a guerrilla group that was led by a charismatic religious leader, Archbishop Makarios III, and benefited from many of the resources, including financial, of the Cypriot Orthodox Church. EOKA also drew heavily on religious beliefs, symbols, and rituals.[58] For example, they were inspired by a commitment to Hellenism, an ideology with important religious elements.[59] Second, because a Christian, not Islamist, group fought, the findings point to the role of broader biases against religion than merely Islamophobia. Third, the conventional wisdom does not provide a compelling explanation for the outcome of this case. EOKA members mobilized along religious lines, but they ultimately did compromise on their objectives. And, fourth, the saliency of religion varied across time. British officials were suspicious of the Cypriot Orthodox community from the start, but they did not confirm the Church's involvement until 15 months into the rebellion. This discovery unambiguously linked the Archbishop and the Church

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[56] This information is further supplemented by documents housed at the Imperial War Museum, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College London, the Bodleian Libraries at Oxford University, and the Israel State Archives.
[57] These archives include the Imperial War Museum, and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College London, and the Bodleian Libraries at Oxford University.
[58] French, *Fighting EOKA,* p. 67.
[59] The groups name in Greek is "Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών".

to EOKA, and British views mirror this new information. A negotiated settlement was reached in 1960 despite these factors due to third-party intervention, namely Greece and Turkey.

The remainder of this section explains the methodology I employ, provides a brief background to the conflict, summarizes the British response, and considers alternative explanations.

IV.A. Methodology

Given space constrains, exhaustive empirical testing is outside the scope of this brief analysis. Rather, the purpose of this case study is to establish plausibility of my argument. To that end, I employ process tracing to provide detailed empirical evidence of the role of strategic culture, and more specifically correspondence bias, proposed in this study. Process tracing is an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence within and across cases.[60] This is a particularly helpful method to demonstrate the plausibility and usefulness of my theory because it intentionally shifts the analytical focus from independent variables and outcomes to the hypothesized causal process that link the two.[61]

Four types of empirical tests are typically used to draw causal inferences when using process tracing: straw in the wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive.[62] They are designed to either confirm or eliminate competing explanations based on whether passing the test is necessary and/or sufficient for accepting a particular inference.[63] They can be summarized as follows:[64]

1. *Straw-in-the-Wind Test:* Passing the test increases the plausibility of the hypothesis in

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[60] David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 4 (October 2011): 823–30.

[61] Derek Beach, "Process-Tracing Methods in Social Science," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[62] Bennett, "Process Tracing and Causal Inference." See also James Mahoney, "The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences," *Sociological Methods & Research* 41, no. 4 (November 1, 2012): 570–97.

[63] Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing."

[64] This is as summarized by Bennett, "Process Tracing and Causal Inference," 210.

question, but does not confirm it. Failing weakens the hypothesis, but does not eliminate it.

2. *Hoop Test:* Passing or "jumping" through the hoop increases the plausibility of the hypothesis but does not confirm it. Failing the test eliminates the hypothesis.
3. *Smoking-Gun Test:* Passing confirms the hypothesis. Failing does not eliminate the hypothesis.
4. *Doubly Decisive Test:* Passing confirms the hypothesis and eliminates alternative explanations.

Ultimately, these tests increase the rigor of qualitative case-study research because they require scholars to be as explicit as possible about the types of evidence we should expect to find if a theory is correct and the data that would cast doubt on a claim. This helps to address a common critique of single-case studies, which asserts that researchers can always find cherry-picked support for their argument.[65]

The strongest case in support of my theory would conform to the following five observations: (1) an insurgent group leverages religious identities, beliefs, or rituals or is suspected of doing so to advance its cause, (2) insurgent groups that employ religious violence should not be motivated by a maximalist objective, that is, the desire to destroy or overturn the values or society of the target state; (3) government officials should fixate on the short-term effects of the religious insurgents' actions, rather than their stated policy objectives (4) state decision makers should infer from the effects of religious violence that the insurgents have maximalist objectives; and (5) these inferences should impede the state from compromising with the religious group.

Thee observations would provide evidence that pass three of the four process tracing tests.[66] The first and third criteria pass a straw-in-the-wind test. They affirm the relevance of my theory, but the absence of evidence does not eliminate it. The second and fourth criteria apply to hoop

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[65] Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 14.

[66] Doubly decisive tests are rare in the social sciences, so it should not be surprising that these are not present in this study. See Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, First (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 32.

tests since each is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for my theory to hold. Finally, the fifth observation passes the smoking gun test. Statements by leaders that they were less likely to compromise with religious groups due to the threat they posed provides strong support for my claims and casts substantial doubt on alternative theories that argue insurgents alone drive conflict intractability. The case of the Cyprus Emergency passes each of these tests.

IV. B. Conflict Background

The rebellion that broke out in Cyprus in April 1955 was in many ways the latest episode of a resistance to imperial rule that dated back more than a century. As early as 1821, calls for overthrowing Ottoman rule and joining with the newly independent Greek state found voice on the island. These desires were fueled by a newly independent Greek state and its policy of working for the inclusion of all Greek-speaking members of the Orthodox Church within the boundaries of the former Byzantine Empire. This Pan-Hellenistic ideology, known as *enosis*, further gained traction after British annexation of the island in 1914 and quickly soured relations between colonial administrators and local communities.[67] In 1928, for example, Greek Cypriots protested celebrations of the 15th anniversary of the British occupation of Cyprus. And, in 1931, 5,000 Greek Cypriots demonstrated in the streets of Nicosia and, eventually, burnt down Government House.

The British responded to these early demonstrates with harsh repression, especially compared to policies during the prior two decades. The alleged leaders of the riots, including two Bishops, were deported, and the Greek consul, who was believed to have encouraged the unrest, was expelled.[68] A new law declared it seditious for anyone to advocate a change in the

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[67] N. Morag, "Cyprus and the clash of Greek and Turkish nationalisms," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 10 (2004), 605; I. D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation. Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967* (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2007), 17–18.
[68] French, *Fighting EOKA, p. 50*

sovereignty of the island. It became illegal to fly the Greek flag, or to ring church bells except at times of regular church services. And, the 1882 constitution was also dissolved; colonial governors were to rule the island by decree until British departure in 1960.

By the mid-1950s, calls for *enosis* once again gained traction. However, unlike in prior decades, opposition forces now benefited from clear leadership and organization. Makarios III, in particular, came to serve as the primary figurehead of the movement. Elected Archbishop in 1950 at the age of 37, he inherited a Church that was becoming steadily more involved in politics. His predecessor, for example, created an Ethnarchy Council that combined the leadership of nationalist groups with that of the Church.

Makarios III pushed further. In 1952, during one of his periodic visits to Athens, he established what came to be known as the Liberation Committee. He served as its chairman and political leader. He also recruited a retired Colonel of the Greek army, Georgios Grivas to lead its military wing. The two men worked closely over the next two years to prepare for an armed rebellion using Church resources to finance and smuggle arms on to the island. In addition, early recruits were drawn from two Church-sponsored right-wing youth organizations.[69]

Religious dynamics would continue to define the group throughout the conflict. These practices and ideas did not serve as the cause of the rebellion in Cyprus, but they did significantly shape the organization and conduct of EOKA. For instance, each member was required to swear an oath on the Bible to work for the liberation Cyprus, to sacrifice their lives if necessary for that cause, to obey their leader without question, and never to reveal EOKA's secrets on pain of death. In addition, the group developed a cult of martyrs. The Church was the main vehicle for this idea as it celebrated the memory of dead fighters and organized memorial

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[69] Ibid. They would later also draw from right-wing farmers' movements and other student organizations.

services for them in churches across the island.[70] Appeals to *enosis* itself were also rooted in religious ideas. A return to Greece not only meant political, but also religious, union for Orthodox Christians. Unsurprisingly, then, EOKA propaganda frequently included religious symbols and ideas.

In addition, religion shaped the relationship between EOKA and the local population. It would be false to claim that the group relied, in no small part, on intimidation to deter collaboration with the British.[71] However, the Church was another major factor that fueled civilian support. Prominent clerics not only questioned British activities, but also openly supported the objectives of EOKA. Makarios III, for instance, visited a different village each week to preach against British occupation and in favor of union with Greece.

While EOKA was well organized and enjoyed substantial support form the Greek-Cypriot community, it was far from a specialized fighting force. It suffered from both a shortage of arms and an even greater shortage of people who knew how to use them.[72] Consequently, they relied on basic guerrilla tactics throughout the conflict, especially sabotage, assassinations, and hit-and-run attacks that sought to wear down, rather than defeat, British forces. These efforts made life difficult for colonial officials, but it never seriously threated to overthrow the colonial government.

IV. C. British Response

If my theory is correct, British policymakers should have fixated on the short-term consequences of EOKA activities, rather than their stated policy objectives. And, government

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[70] TNA CO 926/671. Reports by Cyprus Intelligence Committee (fortnightly reviews), 1957; TNA CO 926/672. Reports by Cyprus Intelligence Committee (fortnightly reviews), 1957.
[71] Cypriots that assisted British security forces faced punishment, and even death, from EOKA fighters. TNA WO 33/2736. History of EOKA, 1954–1959, 20 Apr 1960.
[72] Early members, for instance, were carefully selected and trained in Crete prior to the conflict, but later recruits were mainly young schoolboys.

and military officials should have inferred that a political settlement was an unlikely solution because they deemed EOKA to be intransigent. Moreover, these inferences should have been strongest after the summer of 1956, when the Archbishop's involvement in the insurgency became undeniably clear. One need not dig deep in the archival records to find evidence for each of these claims.

IV.C.1. Inferring Objectives from Actions

The views of British officials that came to dominate decision making during the Emergency Period were far from inevitable. Prior to the outbreak of violence in 1955, political elites and the general public in Britain alike expressed more sympathy with the Cypriot people than with other subjects in colonies on the periphery of the Empire. Greek Cypriots were seen as more modern and more Western. This view is well summarized by Conservative MP Richard Broom-White during a visit to the island in 1954: "It seems inconceivable that the Cypriots could become vicious like the Egyptians".[73] These perceptions quickly changed once violence broke out on the island.

When the first explosions erupted across Cyprus, the colonial government had no clear idea who lay behind the actions.[74] Officials on the island suspected that armed resistance was being planned from both the increased fervor of religious sermons and the capture of a ship, the Ayios Georgios, attempting to smuggle explosives and firearms onto the island in January 1955. However, they remained unaware of any formally organized resistance until EOKA announced itself by scattering leaflets after the bombings on April 1, 1955.

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[73] As cited by Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 53.
[74] Susan Lisa Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1995), 197.

The British responded cautiously. They had no intelligence on EOKA; they didn't even know if "Dighenis" represented a person or a committee.[75] Their initial efforts were, therefore, intended to demonstrate that the budding insurgency had not "disrupted the normal life of the Government and people of Cyprus."[76]

To that end, the British spent considerable effort both augmenting the Cyprus Police Force and collecting intelligence on EOKA. The latter continued over the course of the conflict. And, the security forces would compile a voluminous compendium of EOKA pamphlets and materials by 1959. There is little doubt, therefore, that colonial officials were well familiar with the stated objectives and polices of the insurgents. This would matter little, however, as the conflict persisted. The British increasingly focused on the death and destruction caused by EOKA attacks, not what they were intended to achieve.

EOKA violence initially targeted British military installations, and Greek Cypriots working with the colonial authorities, especially for the Cyprus Police Force. The latter included the assassination of a number of Special Branch members within the first few months of the conflict. These activities were met with mixed anxieties. Some officials, especially those back in Whitehall, did not seem to grasp the full extent of the problem on Cyprus. The British press, in contrast, promoted an image of "terror island" in light of the increasing number of assassinations.[77] And, colonial officials on Cyprus increasingly came to adopt this latter position. The Cyprus Police Commissioner, for instance, described EOKA's goal as "a definite policy of murder" as early as June 1955.[78] This was before British officials had determined an objective for the group or collected much information about its membership.

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[75] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 55.
[76] TNA FO 371/117629: Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 5 April 1955.
[77] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 81.
[78]Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 197

By the summer of 1956, the situation changed dramatically with the capture of General

Grivas' diaries. The suspicions of Church involvement were confirmed. And, British views of

EOKA reflected this new information. Most notably, they now attributed a more "provocative"

function or "senseless quality" to many of EOKA's attacks, especially those on British civilians

unconnected with the administration and security forces.[79] This led them to infer that EOKA was

not fighting to win over the sympathy of the local population, despite this being a stated

objective of the group. Instead, they now unequivocally believed that EOKA was trying to

convince the British they had no place on Cyprus and the cost of staying would be their lives.[80]

Colonial officials drew these conclusions despite the fact that there was no significant

increase in EOKA activity. In fact, the first, and perhaps, largest EOKA offensive took place

between October 1955 and March 1956. A second phase to those operations ignited after the

deportation of Makarios and lasted until November 1956. However, the intensity of fighting was

not significantly, different between the two periods. If anything, the former was the more deadly.

Yet, EOKA was construed as more hostile and fanatical from the second stage of fighting

on. The British concluded that the organization imposed its hegemony over the Greek Cypriot

population by murder and intimidation.[81] It admitted that EOKA did mount some spectacular

sabotage operations, "but, for the most part it was four years of stealthy murder of people usually

momentarily defenceless, and nearly always carried out in circumstances where there was no risk

to the attacker."[82] Grivas was also increasingly accused of using "fascist strong-arm methods."[83]

Even the youngest members of EOKA were not above reproach. Arrested members of a

Limassol sabotage group in November 1956, for instance, were described as "cold-blooded

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[79] Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds*.199.
[80] TNA CO 926/454: Appreciation of the Situation by Dighenis, 5 July 1954.
[81] TNA CO 926/1123: Papadopoulos to Smith, 8 Dec 1958.
[82] TNA FCO 141/4488: W.M.T. Magan, Grivas: A Personality Sketch, 11 Mar 1959.
[83] TNA WO 33/2736: History of EOKA, 1954–1959, 20 April 1960.

murderers capable of killing in broad daylight in urban areas after carefully selecting soft targets and opportune escape routes".[84] Some of these members were only fifteen years old.

By late 1956, the British also identified a "hardcore, fanatical" core to the insurgent organization "surrounded by a much larger number of hangers-on".[85] Harding defined this extreme element as "fanatical EOKA supporters, the members of the mountain gangs who were prepared to carry out any crime to further their own ends."[86] This language is eerily reminiscent of assessments made about the Stern Gang in Mandatory Palestine. At the end of the conflict, the unofficial record by the War Office claimed that at any one moment EOKA never had more than 200 – 300 of these hard-core members.[87] Yet, two years earlier at the height of a renewed offensive by EOKA, a senior colonial official insisted that almost all of the nearly 800 persons in detention represent "a hard core of men who have shown themselves capable of murder, either by bombs or firearms."[88] This discrepancy is line with my argument that officials fixate on the short-term consequences, rather than political objectives, of religious insurgents during a conflict. According to EOKA's own accounts after the conflict, the first estimate is far more accurate.[89] The British saw more of a threat than may actually have been the case.

Finally, the British construed the Church increasingly in adversarial terms. Orthodox priests were described, for example, as "crusaders."[90] It was partly for this reason that they assumed the arrest and deportation of the head of the church, Archbishop Makarios III, in 1956

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[84] TNA CO 926/670/CIC(56)36(Final): CIC, Intelligence Review for the first half of Dec 1956, 21 Dec 1956.
[85] TNA CO 926/521: Security Ops in Cyprus, 1954-56.
[86] TNA FCO 141/4313: Harding to Colonial Office, 27 July 1956.
[87] TNA WO 33/2736: History of EOKA, 1954–1959, 20 April 1960.
[88] TNA FCO 141/4342: US(IS) to Sinclair, 2 Dec 1957.
[89] Varnavas, *A History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA 1955-1959*, 70; French, *Fighting EOKA*, 65.
[90] TNA WO 33/2736: A History of EOKA 1954-1959.

might decapitate EOKA.[91] This tactic, however, failed and led to considerably more unrest on the island.[92]

Ultimately, the increased focus on EOKA's actions led the British to determine the group had maximalist aims, even though this was not actually the case. The goals of EOKA remained consistent throughout the conflict. They sought an end to British political and military influence on the island, the right of self-determination, and the eventual political union of Cyprus with Greece. These claims were, as with many insurgent groups, often couched in hyperbolic terms. But, Grivas himself repeated on many occasions that EOKA did not seek the "total defeat of the British forces in Cyprus." [93] Rather, EOKA sought to "win a moral victory through a process of attrition, by harassing, confusing and finally exasperating the enemy forces."[94]

The British inferred otherwise. The clearest example of the British assigning maximalist aims to EOKA comes from the Harding-Makarios talks that took place from October 1955 to February 1956. The prominent British historian Robert Holland characterizes these meetings as "one of the most protracted and complex exchanges in the history of British decolonization after the Second World War."[95]

The attitude at the start of the talks was "frank and cordial". [96] The Archbishop made explicit his desire for a political settlement. And, this was met with cautious optimism from Harding. The Governor wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in late November, "Conditions already warrant such a step [emergency regulations], but I have refrained from

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[91] An initial report noted the disorganization of EOKA following the deportation of the Archbishop. However, this soon proved to be overly optimistic. See TNA FCO 371/12388: Cyprus and enosis.
[92] For example, Greek-Cypriots called a three-day general strike. See Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 120.
[93] Grivas, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 5.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 85.
[96] TNA FCO 371/117664: Harding telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 5 October 1955.

seeking your authority for it while there remains the slightest hope of gaining the Archbishop's co-operation."[97]

Over time, however, the relationship deteriorated. The Archbishop's theological habit of chiseling away little gains by protracted argument created in Harding an impression of insatiability, which made him increasingly uneasy and impatient over the five-month exchange.[98] The fact that Makarios was a religious figure from an unfamiliar tradition accentuated these issues. Harding made no secret that he was intensely uncomfortable negotiating with the Primate of the Cypriot Orthodox Church.[99] In particular, he found the fact that a religious leader engaged in the same "subterfuges and tricks" as leaders of "underdog nationalities" extremely disconcerting.[100] And, before long, the Governor wrote to Lennox-Boyd, "[I] Am withholding recommendation of the declaration of state of emergency pending the results of the meeting with Makarios. If his attitude remains uncompromising I have little doubt that it will be necessary to declare a state of emergency and take consequential action."[101] By February 1956, Harding's patience would run out. Not even one year into the conflict, the most positive of British officials wrote that any agreement with Makarios would not end the conflict. Rather, it would merely initiate a new phrase.[102]

In sum, British officials, especially those on the island, focused more on the consequences of EOKA's violence than its stated goals. They were well aware of the latter. EOKA propaganda littered not only the streets, but also the file rooms of colonial offices. Yet, these were not to be believed. EOKA's actions spoke louder than words.

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[97] TNA CO 926/561: Harding to Colonial Secretary, 23 Nov 1955.
[98] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 85.
[99] See Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 95.
[100] TNA WO 32/16260: Harding to Colonial Secretary, 5 Oct 1955.
[101] TNA CO 926/545: Harding to Colonial Secretary, 4 Oct 1955.
[102] TNA FCO 371/117678: Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 15 December 1955.

IV.C.2. Shifting Strategic Preferences

Once the British determined EOKA would stop at nothing to achieve enosis, they discounted the efficacy of a negotiated settlement. This resulted in a shift towards coercion for dealing with the local population, EOKA fighters, and the clergy. And, the religious nature of the conflict was often referenced to explain, not merely justify, these policies.

Prior to the discovery of the Grivas diaries, the British focused on undermining the influence of the Church, but not employing force against Greek Cypriot communities. As Harding summarized in a December 1955 telegram to the Colonial Office, "We cannot expect in a short time to induce the Greek Cypriots to see their basic Hellenism in perspective but we can do something about the agencies who are at present inflaming and exploiting these emotions to the point of violence."[103] His plan focused heavily on improving the social and economic situation of the Greek Cypriot community so as to demonstrate the benefits of British rule.

By the summer of 1956, security forces shifted to more coercive tactics. In July, for instance, the Nicosia District Security Committee set a policy of collective punishment "to demonstrate to the individual that subservience to the Greek Orthodox Church does not pay." [104] The report concluded that Cypriots, "must be brought to realise that subservience to a religious organisation as the dictator of its political expression is contrary to the modern political development of any country"[105] This example illustrates how British officials believed that not only did the Church have a strong hold over the Greek Cypriot population, but also that it could only be broken (if at all) through force.

A similar view came to dominate attitudes' towards EOKA. By mid-1957, EOKA had been checked and contained for a period of time. Yet, still British officials doubted a bargained

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[103] TNA CO 926/474: Harding to Colonial Office, 23 Dec 1955.
[104] TNA FCO 141/4682: Beresford, to Administrative Secretary, 14 July 1956.
[105] Ibid.

solution would bring the conflict to its final end. In May 1957, Harding wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: "Terrorism is still latent in Cyprus. EOKA has a certain limited existing potential and also a definite recovery capability. Archbishop Makarios remains intransigent and would not hesitate to start terrorism again if he decided it would serve his purpose."[106]

Harding's replacement later that year, Sir Hugh Foot, would reach a similar conclusion. Although he had a reputation for liberalism and a preference for a peaceful settlement, coercive measures increased, rather than decreased during his tenure. This has much to do with the intercommunal violence that began to erupt between Greek Cypriot and Turkish communities in 1958.However, views of EOKA, which resurfaced with renewed vigor around that time, also played a part. A 1958 telegram from Foot succinctly summarizes his position: "the main enemy is EOKA and only continuous and relentless action will eliminate it."[107] In the end, the new Governor ordered the detention without trial of more people in the space of a week than Harding had detained in the whole of his time on the island.[108]

Finally, religious clergy continued to stand out as the main stumbling block to a political settlement. The British thought they had scored a major victory when they deported Makarios in March 1956. They couldn't have been more wrong. The Archbishop's removal created a deep sense of resentment even amongst people who previously had been sympathetic to the British.[109] And, no alternative interlocutor emerged to represent the Greek Cypriot community. Remarks by the Deputy Governor, George Sinclair capture the situation the British made for themselves. In a 1957 telegram he insisted, "there is no one among the Greek Cypriots with whom you can have

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[106] TNA FCO 141/4412: Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 24 May 1957.
[107] TNA DEFE 13/97: Cyprus Internal Security, Telegrams from Hugh Foot, Nov 1958.
[108] French, *Fighting EOKA*, 269.
[109] French, *Fighting EOKA*, 105.

effective discussions except nominees of EOKA"[110]

Eventually international pressure advocated for Makarios' return as a way to push towards a political settlement. The British remained deeply cynical of this possibility. The Secretary of State for the Colonies Lennox-Boyd went so far as to tell the House of Commons that Makarios would not be allowed to return to Cyprus unless he condemned violence.[111] But, this proved to be an empty threat. Makarios did return; negotiations pushed forward; and a political settlement was reached in February 1959.

In the end, the British reluctantly accepted the London and Zurich Agreements. This was in large part due to domestic politics, as discussed previously. But, it was also influenced by the military assessment at the time. The British Defence Co-ordinating Committee (Middle East) and the Joint Planning Staff in London remained convinced that retaining the whole of the island was essential to British interests. The Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, argued otherwise. He squashed their recommendations, stating, "In its present state of unrest Cyprus is more of a military liability than a military asset."[112] He added, "If the size of our garrison is to be reduced to tolerable limits, a political settlement is essential; and the proposals now being discussed between the Greek and Turkish Governments, offer for the first time the hope of such a settlement."[113] Would Sandys have been so eager to accept this proposition if international actors were not involved in the negotiation process? It is beyond the scope of this study to answer this question. But, what the evidence does suggest is that such a compromise was reached much later than it otherwise might have been had the British not faced an insurgent movement so defined by its religious dimensions.

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[110] TNA CO 926/1071: Sinclair to Foot, 28 Nov 1957.
[111] Bodleian Libraries, Rhodes House Library: Sir Hugh Foot. Mss Mediterranean s. 35.1/3. Martin to Foot, 4 Dec 1957.
[112] TNA DEFE 11/340: Sandys to BDCC(Middle East), 6 Jan 1959.
[113] Ibid.

Although the British knew very little about EOKA at the start of the insurgency, they expressed little doubt about the insurgent organization's goal by the end of the conflict. EOKA had a maximalist objective to impose a total defeat on the British and radically change life on the island. Consequently, EOKA was not a group with which one could reason. These inferences were strongly shaped by the increased saliency of religion in the conflict. And, they meant British officials remained reluctant to reach a political settlement right up to the end of the conflict.

IV.D. Alternative Explanations

The conventional wisdom for religious conflict intractability provides at least two alternative interpretations for the protracted nature of the Cyprus Emergency. The means mechanism suggests that the religious dimensions of EOKA enabled them to fight longer and harder than if they had drawn on purely materialist incentives.

The British certainly believed this was the case. In line with the evidence presented above, an officer interviewing captured rebels in 1957 reported, "The marked religious fervor with which members of this gang have sustained their morale is noteworthy and some are quite convinced that 'God and the Virgin' have hitherto protected them from capture."[114] The zeal of EOKA fighting was a major concern for the British; at least it was an anxiety they frequently voiced. And, it was certainly an idea EOKA veterans and Cypriot organizations have been quick to reinforce. A recurrent theme of their histories are heroic EOKA fighters, captured and tortured by the British, who never divulged any information, preferring instead to become martyrs for the righteous cause of enosis.[115]

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[114] TNA CO 926/678: Weekly Political Situation Reports from Cyprus, 1957-1959.
[115] See Varnavas, *A History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA 1955-1959*.

Yet, despite British and Cypriot reports of a religious commitment to EOKA, coercive force best explains the cohesion of the insurgent organization.[116] Of the civilian deaths mentioned above, the majority was at the hands of EOKA for defecting from the organization or cooperating with the British authorities. The assassination of defectors was often conducted publicly to deter similar behavior in the future.[117]

The British were not unaware of these factors. Constant reports came in throughout the summer and early autumn of 1957 that "intimidation is still effective in preventing any open deviation from the Ethnarchy line."[118] By the end of September the Commissioner at Lefka reported, "The pressure of fear is being successfully maintained by visits and attacks of masked men."[119] Yet, despite the clear coercion employed by EOKA, the British saw the religious dynamics as equally, if not more, important to contributing to the group's cohesion.

If religion was not particularly influential in holding EOKA together, perhaps it enabled them to fight longer and harder. The evidence here too points in the opposite direction. The insurgency in Cyprus was never particularly destructive. This can largely be chalked up to the inexperience and poor training of EOKA fighters. As but one example, consider that only one of five assassination attempts in the summer of 1955 was successful. Two failed entirely, and two others left the victims injured, but alive.[120] Religion may have enabled EOKA to lower the inhibitions of some of its members to kill, but it did not increase the lethality of the group.

British losses were, thus low, especially in comparison to other conflicts around the time in Malaya and Kenya. Moreover, EOKA tactics centered on small acts of sabotage aimed at

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[116] French, *Fighting EOKA*, 193
[117] TNA FCO 141/4751: Intimidation of Greek-Cypriots by EOKA, 1958-59; TNA WO 33/2736: History of EOKA, 1954–1959, 20 Apr 1960.
[118] TNA FCO 141/3720: Wynne, Public Opinion Survey, 27 July 1957.
[119] TNA FCO 141/3720: Assistant Commissioner Lefka to COSDO, 30 Sept 1957.
[120] TNA CO 926/414: Main HQ, MELF to War Office, 18 July 1955; TNA CO 926/414: Armitage to Colonial Secretary, 12 Aug 1955; TNA CO 926/455/CIC(55)27(Final): CIC, The nature of EOKA, its political background and sources of direction, 18 Oct 1955.

wearing down the British. Direct attacks on security forces did occur, but these were rare or limited to individual assassination attempts.

A March 1959 report from the Cyprus government captures the scale of violence. One hundred and four British officers were killed and another 601 suffered injuries over the course of four and a half years. The police experienced 51 dead and 187 wounded. EOKA, in turn, lost fewer than 100 members at the hands of the security force. The Greek Cypriot civilians, of whom 263 were killed and another 252 injured, experienced the heaviest casualties.[121]

If religion did not provide the means for EOKA to hold out for the best deal possible, perhaps it offered the motivation? The call for enosis did involve religious elements, including the commitment to bring all Greek Orthodox people into one political territory. But, was this an indivisible goal?

As discussed above, the British inferred this was the case. They saw Makarios as uncompromising and willing to hold out until he got exactly what he wanted – the full union of Cyprus with Greece. Anything short of this would mean the Cypriot people had fallen short of their historical and religious obligations.

The calls for "Enosis and only Enosis" stuck too well with the British. Their view of an intransigent cleric and insurgent group were as misplaced as their perception that religion was the primary glue that held EOKA together. Religious goals did matter, but not more than materialist concerns. The Archbishop and EOKA were open to compromise, although like any side they wanted to achieve the most they could from a bargained solution. Moreover, Grivas engaged in a number of truces from 1956 to 1958. And, these were not the desperate attempts of a group on the ropes and desperate for respite. Finally, the London and Zurich Agreements signed in 1959 did not include everything the Archbishop desired, but he did sign it.

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[121] TNA FCO 141/3126: Information Research Unit, Casualty state from 1 Apr 1955 to midnight 31 Dec 1958.

In the end, the case of Cyprus illustrates how the religious dimensions of a conflict can severely undermine negotiation efforts because of state, not insurgent, intransigence. Despite the relatively low lethality of the conflict, government and military officials fixated on the activities of EOKA, not its stated objectives. And, they inferred the group would stop at nothing to achieve enosis. Table 4.1 specific pieces of evidence offered in support of these claims, which again passes three of the four process tracing tests employed in this study.

Table 4.1: Causal Process Observations of the Cyprus Emergency

Observation	Straw-in-the Wind Test (Some Support)	Hoop Test (Strong support)	Smoking Gun Test (Strongest Support)
Actual or suspected religious violence	Religious leadership, material resources, beliefs, symbols, and rituals.	-	-
Religious insurgents not motivated by maximalist objective	-	The goal of EOKA was enosis. They did not seek the total defeat of the British, rather a political settlement that allowed for self-determination.	-
Officials fixate on short-term consequences	British officials emphasized insurgent destruction, especially after mid-1956.	-	-
Officials infer maximalist objectives	-	British officials determined that EOKA and the Archbishop would continue fighting, even if a political settlement was reached.	-
Officials demonstrate reluctance to compromise	-	-	Stated British reluctance to negotiate with the Archbishop.

V. Conclusion and Implications

The primary aim of this paper has been to challenge the conventional wisdom that religious conflicts are more difficult to resolve solely due to the beliefs and identities of rebels.

To that end, I provided an argument for why state forces may play as significant a role, if not more so, than insurgents in obstructing the peaceful resolution of religious conflicts. Drawing on insights from social psychology, along with religious and strategic studies, I argued that Western political and military elites share a secular strategic culture that heightens the correspondence between religious insurgents' behavior and motives. And, this militates against compromise because it leads state officials to discount the efficacy of a negotiated settlement. A within-case analysis of British counterinsurgency operations during the Cyprus Emergency (1955-59) illustrated the plausibility of these claims.

As this paper represents a first attempt to introduce a new theory and empirical approach for studying religious conflicts, its claims should be taken cautiously. More could be said about precisely how and why a strategic culture of religion arises and influences strategic choices. I have presented these as an aggregate set of preferences, but it may be that particular individuals are more influenced by them than others. This would complicate causal models that seek to isolate the independent effect of a strategic culture of religion.

In addition, due to space limitations, I have only presented preliminary evidence in support of my claims. Representative pieces of evidence have been offered in support of the proposed mechanism. Skeptics might demand additional data or cross-national comparisons. British counterinsurgency campaigns concurrent with the Cyprus Emergency offer one useful possibility for testing the broader reach of my claims given a similar amount of historical data is available for these conflicts and a number of alternative explanations, such as regime type, remain constant.

Despite these limitations, this paper still has important implications for the study of both religious violence and counterinsurgency. First, it challenges the strongly held and widely

influential view that the negative elements of religious conflicts are principally due to the demanding and uncompromising nature of combatants' beliefs and identities. And, it suggests the need to establish a research agenda on the role of state forces in religious conflicts. It may very well be the case that religious civil wars are longer, nastier, and more brutish than other internal conflicts. But, state forces may be responsible for a large part of the destruction.

Second, this study provides new insight into a central puzzle of civil war research, which asks why counterinsurgents repeatedly rely on strategies of brutal force despite its inefficacy and options for bargaining. Civil war scholars typically overlook cultural factors that influence military planning in favor of rationalist explanations. However, if, as I suggest, insurgents that mobilize along religious lines are viewed as especially threatening, decision makers may be more likely to identify the effective forms of response as brute force, rather than selective violence, containment, or negotiated settlement.

Third, this study suggests the value of archival research in uncovering intriguing new puzzles and comparisons. British counterinsurgency operations during the early postwar period suggest that many of the features that observers have seen as being peculiar to early twenty-first century insurgencies, can be observed in previous periods of conflict. Moreover, historical case studies of counterinsurgency operations offer exciting opportunities to collect and analyze the type of data government and military officials are unlikely to share about ongoing or recently completed operations.

In the end, this paper points to new theoretical and methodological possibilities for the study of religious violence and irregular warfare. It suggests the value of diverting some of our attention away from the study of interest-based calculations by rational agents towards the cultural constraints that can frame such choices. Even more importantly, this paper suggests the

value of shifting the focus from how religion influences rebels to its influence on military planning. Looking at only one side of the battlefield misses the many ways religion influences contemporary warfare.