

Introduction: Searching for Strategy in an Age of Peacebuilding

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The most recent generation in global politics might well be called the “age of peacebuilding.” What merits the moniker is an intense, diverse, and global wave of efforts to end the violence and colossal injustices of civil war, genocide, dictatorship, and large-scale poverty and to foster justice and prosperity in their stead. Since 1988, the United Nations (UN) has undertaken peacebuilding operations in revolutionary number and frequency. Since the end of the Cold War, an unprecedented number of civil wars have ended through negotiated settlements. A “third wave of democracy,” beginning in 1974, has seen some eighty societies move toward human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.¹ Everyone, it seems—from the UN to the World Bank to the World Social Forum to relief and development agencies—has pursued ambitious quests to end poverty. Transitional justice has become a global pursuit, involving variously national trials, vetting practices, international criminal tribunals, a permanent International Criminal Court, over thirty truth commissions, an outbreak of reparations and public apologies, and sometimes forgiveness in the political realm. Western states have struggled to establish security and the rule of law in sites of violence and anarchy—the United States in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq; Germany in Afghanistan; and the European Union (EU) in Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Human rights organizations, religious institutions, tribal elders, and citizens of domestic societies have sought to resolve and transform conflict in innovative ways, too.

But if this montage of energies describes a trend, so too it evokes urgent questions. Are all of these efforts truly ones of peacebuilding? Which have been successful? Under what conditions are they

successful? Which are just? By what criteria? Do some of these efforts affect others, positively or negatively? Most of all, are there concepts, doctrines, or paradigms that tell us how peacebuilding ought to be pursued?

The dominant thinking is the “liberal peace”—dominant in that it pervades the most powerful and prestigious institutions and governments who take on the work of peacebuilding.² Its aims are simple and familiar: to end armed violence and to establish human rights, democracy, and market economies. Its intellectual provenance is the liberal tradition that arose from the Western Enlightenment. It envisions the UN, outside intervening states, state governments, and oppositional factions, undertaking mediation, military intervention, war settlement, disarmament, election monitoring, refugee resettlement, and the creation of free government institutions, free markets, and a free media. A cardinal virtue is finitude: when will the operation end?

Such an approach is far too narrow, this volume argues. None of the authors herein rejects human rights, democracy, economic growth, or the United Nations. But the building of peace, we propose, is far wider, deeper, and more encompassing and involves a far greater array of actors, activities, levels of society, links between societies, and time horizons than the dominant thinking recognizes. It involves the United Nations carrying out sanctions against terrorist groups in a way that also promotes good governance, human rights, and economic development in the countries where the sanctions are targeted. It involves coordinating the international prosecution of war criminals with the need to settle a civil war and the efforts of local cultures and leaders to bring peace. It involves educating the children of the next generation so as to transform their hatred into tolerance and even friendship. It involves nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society. It involves religious actors, who are all but ignored in most current thinking on peacebuilding. It involves combating inequalities that are embedded in global structures of power and wealth. It involves trials, truth commissions, and reparations, and also apology, forgiveness, and rituals of reconciliation. Not only is the broad range of these players, practices, and periods crucial for achieving a sustainable peace, each is linked to others through cause and effect, for better or for worse. Effective peacebuilding, it follows, aims to strengthen these ligatures of interdependence, accenting, deepening, and synchronizing them, and linking them further with the efforts of governments and international institutions and with the broad project of building a just peace in and between societies. Any particular effort at such strengthening may be called a strategy of peace.

What follows in the rest of this introduction is a brief analysis of the liberal peace and its critics—not because strategic peacebuilding merely defines itself against the liberal peace but because the concept becomes clearer when situated in the global conversation about peacebuilding. Prominent criticisms of the liberal peace as well as movements within the liberal peace indeed point in the direction of strategic peacebuilding. Next comes a deeper definition and description of strategic peacebuilding. The introduction closes with a conceptual map of the volume that shows how the chapters both reflect strategic peacebuilding as well as advance it through strategies of peace.

The Liberal Peace and Its Critics

When, in 1989, four decades of worldwide ideological rivalry came to an end, the global consensus on human rights, democracy, and free markets sharply expanded as did possibilities for cooperation in the UN Security Council—a “new world order,” U.S. President George H. W. Bush called it. Meanwhile, large-scale ethnic conflicts raged around the world,³ and a form of violent and impoverishing anarchy known as the “failed state” became prevalent. This was a world that, to paraphrase Voltaire’s description of the Holy Roman Empire, seemed neither new nor global nor particularly orderly. These two divergent trends converged as supply and demand to yield what is known as the UN Revolution, an intense spate of efforts by the Security Council and its authorized agents to bring peace and relief to sites of calamity. Between 1987 and 1994, the Security Council increased its resolutions by four times, its peacekeeping operations by three times, its economic sanctions sevenfold, its military forces in the field from 10,000 to more than 70,000, and its budget for peacekeeping from \$230 million to \$3.6 billion.⁴ Of its fifty-five peace operations since 1945, forty-one (75%) began after 1989.⁵ Between 1989 and 1999, it sent out thirty-three peace operations, more than double the fifteen missions it had conducted during the previous four decades.⁶ Between 1989 and 2005, it conducted twenty-two “post-conflict peacebuilding operations”—the most extensive sort in administrative terms.⁷

Not only the number but just as notably the ambition of these operations swelled. Exceeding the boundaries of traditional peacekeeping operations, which depend on the consent of the parties to a conflict and do not legally constitute intervention, many of these operations involved armed force sanctioned by Chapter VII of the UN Charter and overrode state sovereignty, flouting the will of at least one party to the conflict. Other operations formally remained traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI but mushroomed in their mission, coming to be dubbed “Chapter six and a half.” Both sorts pursued aims ranging among humanitarian relief, disarmament of armed factions, election monitoring, refugee resettlement, the construction of government institutions, and at times even running government institutions—the latter a particularly poignant departure from the principle of state sovereignty.

These operations coincided with yet another trend, a marked rise in the frequency of civil wars being settled through negotiations rather than the victory of one side or a petering out. Political scientist Monica Duffy Toft reports that between 1940 and 1989, 75 to 100 percent of civil wars in any one decade ended in military victory, whereas only a handful ended in negotiation. By contrast, during the 1990s, a sharply increased 42 percent of civil wars ended in negotiations, coming to exceed the 40 percent that ended in military victory.⁸ In fact, more civil wars ended through negotiations between 1989 and 2004 than in the previous two centuries.⁹ It is frequently in conjunction with such negotiations that UN operations have taken root.

The manifesto of the UN revolution was former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* of 1992. Written in the heady days of the new

world order, the document both reflects on the ballooning of UN operations and sets a course for its continuation. Four major peace operations were envisioned by Boutros-Ghali: (1) preventive diplomacy; (2) an expanded version of traditional peacekeeping; (3) peacemaking, which brings hostile parties to agreement generally through peaceful means but at times through Chapter VII enforcement; and finally, (4) postconflict peacebuilding, a range of efforts to consolidate peace after a settlement.¹⁰ Subsequent documents written or commissioned by secretary generals have followed up on the proposals of *An Agenda for Peace*. Boutros-Ghali himself issued a supplement in 1995.¹¹ In 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi to convene a panel on peace operations, which recommended greatly enhanced institutional capacities.¹² That same year, in response to a challenge from Annan, the government of Canada convened an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to produce *Responsibility to Protect*, a set of principles intended to guide and promote humanitarian intervention.¹³ In 2004, a similar panel, this one commissioned directly by Annan, produced *A More Secure World*, recommending UN reforms that included a Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate and strengthen transitions from war to peace.¹⁴

Here the assumptions of the liberal peace can be found—its stress on human rights, democracy, free markets, and the central role of international institutions and state governments in building peace.¹⁵ In 1996, Boutros-Ghali issued a document called *An Agenda for Democratization*.¹⁶ The same assumptions can be found among those departments and officials in Western governments that most involve themselves in building peace, not least the U.S. government, which has played an integral role in UN-authorized peace operations in Iraq (1990s), Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, and in operations outside UN mandates in Kosovo and Iraq (1999 and 2003). They are found, too, in the Washington Consensus, a doctrine of economic development shared by the World Bank and agencies of the U.S. government stressing reduced trade barriers and public sectors and generally free market economic policies in developing country governments.¹⁷ They are found in much scholarship on UN peace operations.¹⁸

In 2005, Andrew Mack reported in the *Human Security Report* that contrary to abounding myths, civil wars, genocides, and international crises all declined sharply after the end of the Cold War, and he credited UN peace operations as the primary source of the trend.¹⁹ Have UN operations achieved such success? Scholars differ over the question, and their differences depend on the stringency of their standards.

Representative of a skeptical assessment is political scientist Roland Paris, who, focusing on the effects of postconflict peacebuilding operations in promoting political and market liberalization, finds that only two out of eleven operations between 1989 and 1999—Namibia and Croatia—were successful, measured by amelioration of the conditions that give rise to conflict and a positive impact on “the likelihood of stable and lasting peace within the host country.”²⁰ Political scientists George Downs and Stephen John Stedman take Paris to task for adopting such demanding standards that he cannot

distinguish between catastrophic failures and partial successes and hence derives too pessimistic a verdict. To them, UN operations are successful if they bring large-scale violence to an end and do so on a self-enforcing basis that allows them to exit without fear of violence resurging. On this basis, they survey sixteen UN efforts to implement peace accords between 1980 and 1997 and conclude that six were successes, four were partial successes, and six were failures.²¹ Reasoning roughly similarly about success is arguably the most sophisticated study of peacebuilding to date, political scientists Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis's *Making War and Building Peace*, an analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, of the factors that contribute to peace in the wake of civil wars. They measure success in terms of both sovereign peace, which "requires an end to civil war, undivided sovereignty, no residual violence . . . and no mass human rights abuses by the state," as well as a more robust participatory peace, which includes all of these ends but also a "minimum level of political openness." Doyle and Sambanis discover (among their other conclusions) that UN peace operations have a significant positive effect on participatory peace two years after the end of a war and that UN peace operations are positively correlated with the length of the peace, reducing peace failures by 50 percent.²²

The debate over criteria for success need not be settled here; it ought only to be noted that even the most favorable evaluations judge the success of UN peace operations to be mixed. Doyle and Sambanis's quantitative analysis is probabilistic and includes cases of both successful and failed peace operations. One of their findings is that in the short run, UN missions have little effect on whether parties resume warfare, though in the long run their pacifying effect is stronger—again, a mixed verdict.²³ Other studies show a large proportion of peace settlements relapsing into violence. The negotiated settlements that have become so characteristic of the post-Cold War period revert to violence three times as often as civil wars that end in the victory of one side.²⁴ According to Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, most studies show that somewhere between a fifth and a third of all settled conflicts revert back to warfare within five years.²⁵ Andrew Mack's 2007 study showed that armed conflicts ending with a negotiated settlement experienced a reversion rate of 43 percent within five years.²⁶ Most arresting are two outbreaks of violence that followed the breakdown of UN peace operations: Angola in 1993, which resulted in 350,000 deaths, and Rwanda in 1994, which left 800,000 dead. Peacebuilding still has a long way to go.

Reacting to this mixed verdict, these and other analysts have proposed improvements. Paris diagnoses the problem as a rush to bring about political and economic liberalization, which undermines stability if it takes place in the absence of stable government institutions. "Institutionalization before liberalization," he counsels.²⁷ Downs and Stedman claim that good peacebuilding rests on a better understanding of two critical variables—the difficulty of the environment and the willingness of outside parties to intervene—and the factors that shape both. Within operations, Stedman considers demobilizing combatants to be the most important task.²⁸ Doyle and Sambanis somewhat complexify Downs and Stedman's model by proposing a "peacebuilding

triangle” in which international capacities, levels of hostility, and local capacities are the three crucial assets for peacebuilding success.²⁹ Former Ambassador James Dobbins and his coauthors (who, like Downs and Stedman, think that peacebuilding operations have been a mixed success) stress sizing up the necessary resources—which they calculate with admirable precision—and adopting a multiplicity of practices.³⁰ Francis Fukuyama’s analysis of statebuilding criticizes the Washington Consensus for devaluing state capacity and argues for measures that strengthen state institutions under the rule of law, but remains broadly skeptical of international efforts at peacebuilding.³¹ In her study of civil wars, Toft argues that negotiated settlements, which are far less likely than victories to remain stable, will only last when an outside party offers combatants a combination of harms and benefits for adhering to it; third-party intervention alone is not enough. She particularly stresses the importance of security sector reform.³² Inquiring into the kinds of domestic institutions and territorial settlements through which civil wars have been settled, political scientists Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild analyze and argue that majoritarian democracy is far more stable than power sharing or partition.³³ All of these analyses, however, work roughly within the assumptions of the liberal peace: stable peace, human rights, democracy, and market economies are the primary ends; intergovernmental institutions, state governments, and warring parties are the primary actors. Generally—with the possible exception of certain aspects of Doyle and Sambanis’s model that are stressed in Sambanis’s chapter herein—they do not approach the holism of strategic peacebuilding.³⁴

Yet in the principle and the practice, in the doctrine and the debate over peacebuilding during the period inaugurated by the UN revolution, one can discern a movement toward holism.³⁵ Since the early days of no-fly zones in Iraq and intervention in Somalia, peacebuilding operations have taken on an increasingly complex, multifold, and ambitious array of tasks. First in Cambodia and Bosnia, then more extensively in eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, and East Timor, operations took the form of an “international administration” that assumed, at least for a short time, sovereign powers, much like international trusteeships did earlier in the twentieth century.³⁶ In the doctrine of the UN, strains of holism are perceptible in both *An Agenda for Peace* and in the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, where Boutros-Ghali wrote of the multiple tasks involved in postconflict peacebuilding.³⁷ They crescendo in the Brahimi Report, which points to the need for peacebuilding strategy, integrating peacebuilding into peacekeeping operations, and incorporating a comprehensive program for national reconciliation into peace operations,³⁸ and in a 2001 statement of the Security Council recognizing that

peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian, and human rights programmes [*sic*] and mechanisms. This requires short- and long-term action tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus

on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.³⁹

Then, the report, *A More Secure World*, proposed a UN Peacebuilding Commission whose mission would include coordinating the efforts of the UN Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and representatives of principal donor countries, the country where the intervention is taking place, and regional and subregional organizations—also a thrust toward holism.⁴⁰ In December 2005, the Peacebuilding Commission was created. For its part, the World Bank took a step toward holism in a 2006 report proclaiming and documenting the role of civil society in peacebuilding.⁴¹ But for all of their thrusts, strides, and movements toward holism, these landmark statements of the liberal peace stop short of directly and forthrightly conceptualizing an approach to peacebuilding that integrates diverse and interdependent actors, activities, and time horizons.⁴²

A Proposal for Strategic Peacebuilding

The authors in this volume take up from where these trajectories have led the business of peacebuilding. A lasting and even reasonably just peace, we claim, depends on a wide array of actors and activities, at all levels of society and between societies, oriented toward the past, the present, and the future. These sectors are interdependent, and in taking them into its range of vision, strategic peacebuilding evinces holism—its most quintessential characteristic. It is the mission of advocates and practitioners of strategic peacebuilding to exploit this interdependence and holism, synergetically linking sectors that would otherwise remain isolated or in conflict. The intentionality of such efforts is what gives force to the adjective *strategic*. Strategic peacebuilders are like doctors who understand that the body is composed of interconnected systems and then specialize in certain regions of connection with the conviction that these sub-systems crucially sustain the entire anatomy. A feature of this medicine is its interest not only in laws, institutions, and policies but in emotions, attitudes, beliefs, legitimacy, and, broadly speaking, the wide range of relationships among citizens. In pursuing this interest, it draws wisdom not only from the liberal tradition of human rights, democracy, free markets, and international law and institutions but also from cultural, religious, and tribal traditions.

“Get real!” exclaimed one interlocutor at the November 2006 conference at the University of Notre Dame where the essays for this volume were first presented. How can a holistic approach be anything other than utopian in the face of large-scale violence like the wars in Yugoslavia or Rwanda? Realists might also ask how, given the strains that peacebuilding operations already face, a still more ambitious set of undertakings can be envisioned. Call and Cousens caution that in the context of the UN, calls for integrated strategy “tended to

lose out to 'laundry lists' and what could be called a 'no agency left behind' notion of peacebuilding."⁴³ In advocating greater attention to interdependence, holism, and integration, none of the authors herein has in mind a Peacebuilding Panopticon or a World Office of Strategic Peacebuilding that will direct and command the efforts of all who are involved. Even the Peacebuilding Commission does not have such ambitions, and at the time of this writing has not yet realized the coordinating functions that it was mandated to perform. Nor do the chapters herein call for an abolition of internationally sanctioned military intervention or international policing.⁴⁴ Rather, particular nodes of interdependence, instances of overlap between activities, actors, and other kinds of sectors are what the authors identify and propose ways to develop. Through many such efforts, which may begin to be coordinated once they occur, a more holistic approach to peacebuilding can emerge. Our proposal is not to throw in the kitchen sink but to mix together carefully heretofore unmixed ingredients. Far from placing more strain on the UN and other institutions, such an approach ought to lessen the pressure that they face by spreading the work of peacebuilding over a far greater array of actors endowed with variegated expertise and assets.

That strategic peacebuilding can be successful is evinced through examples in the chapters that follow. John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby's contribution details the fruits of strategic peacebuilding in Mozambique, Colombia, and the Philippines. Gerard Powers points to the successful efforts of religious mediators in Guatemala, northern Uganda, and elsewhere. Naomi Roht-Arriaza touts transitional justice efforts in Guatemala for their success in bridging national and local levels to be healing for victims of human rights abuses. Many other success stories emerge. The chapters likewise contain examples of operations that were mixed or lacking in success because of an arguable dearth of strategic peacebuilding. Simon Chesterman, for instance, evaluates several UN missions, among them Kosovo, Somalia, Cambodia, and East Timor, and concludes that their limitations were due in good part to insufficiently strategic aims, inadequate coordination among actors, and poor standards for evaluating success. To be sure, he cautions that modest expectations are in order, but he still believes that progress in all of these areas would improve UN operations—and would, in fact, involve strategic peacebuilding.

Each of the essays asserts some way in which sectors, practices, policies, or time horizons can be linked fruitfully—that is, a strategy of peace. The strategies take a wide variety of forms and involve a wide variety of sectors and activities, reflecting the diverse disciplines and methods of the authors, who include sociologists, legal scholars, peace scholars, political scientists, psychologists, and a historian. By and large, these differences are complementary, reflecting the very character of strategic peacebuilding. At times, they involve creative tensions. Nicholas Sambanis and Jackie Smith each call for a greater integration of economic development into peacebuilding but differ over the wisdom of economic liberalization and the role of international financial institutions. In his concluding essay, Oliver Richmond applauds George Lopez and David Cortright for linking fighting terror with building peace on the ground through

UN policy but still worries that UN counterterrorism policies risk radicalizing extremists and undermining peace processes. Such disagreements are constructive because they offer readers a wider portfolio of strategies of peace to explore and evaluate.

Generally, the book's chapters are arrayed in three broad clusters that each makes the case for strategic peacebuilding in a different way. Chapters 1 through 4 set forth strategic peacebuilding at a general, conceptual level: the theory of strategic peacebuilding. Chapters 5 through 8 make up a second cluster, one that presents peacebuilding "from above," that is, with a central stress on international institutions, especially the United Nations and the International Criminal Court. Chapters 9 through 13 form the third and final grouping, presenting peacebuilding "from below," emphasizing the role of civil society, economic, religious, educational, and other nongovernmental actors. That these divisions are not perfect is entirely to be expected: linkages between levels are a leitmotif in strategic peacebuilding. The essays in the second cluster call for international institutions to be linked to the work of national and nongovernmental actors, and several of those in the third cluster advocate the same sort of links in the other direction. The clusters are a matter of emphasis.

John Paul Lederach and Scott Appleby's chapter orients the whole volume by laying out a foundational theory of strategic peacebuilding, one to which subsequent chapters refer. Lederach is a prominent scholar and practitioner who has pursued what he calls the "art of peacebuilding" in locales as diverse as Nicaragua, Colombia, Nepal, Spain, and Kazakhstan; he is credited with pioneering a paradigm shift from conflict resolution to conflict transformation.⁴⁵ His writings have developed many of the intellectual planks of strategic peacebuilding: relationships, reconciliation, transformation, the importance of multiple social levels and a wide time horizon that involves healing the past as well as envisioning the future, and an "elicitive" method that taps local cultures for their peacebuilding codes.⁴⁶ He teams up with Scott Appleby, a historian and scholar of religion whose book *The Ambivalence of the Sacred* was one of the first to give conceptual depth to the idea of religious peacebuilding. Appleby founded the Catholic Peacebuilding Network, a worldwide association of activists and scholars who seek to advance the study and practice of peacebuilding in the Philippines, Burundi, Colombia, and many other locales.⁴⁷ Lederach and Appleby extend and develop the ideas behind these pursuits, weaving into a new synthesis the concepts of interdependence; holism; transparency; communication; coordination between levels, actors, and practices; and the idea of a comprehensive *justpeace*.

Then, a chapter by Peter Wallensteen, a long-standing leading peace researcher, gives historical and conceptual specificity to the concepts that Lederach and Appleby develop. After laying out the precedents for peacebuilding in both political practice and peace scholarship, Wallensteen unveils an approach to peacebuilding that, echoing the metaphor of a body composed of multiple systems, describes the construction of peace as combining state-building, democracy-building, security-building, nation-building, and market-building. He closes by probing four contextual questions that must

be answered for effective peacebuilding to take place: how the previous war ended, how the previous war started, who is conducting peacebuilding, and the nature of the neighborhood where peacebuilding is taking place. Through developing and applying answers to these questions, effective strategic peacebuilding takes place.

How should peacebuilding initiatives, particularly those of multilateral agencies and NGOs, be evaluated? This is the question that Hal Culbertson, a practitioner and analyst of peacebuilding in both NGO and university settings, poses. His answer is far more than a technical one. A central criterion for assessment, consistent with the vector of this volume, is the NGO's or civil society organization's strategic adaptation to the other actors and sectors of the society in which peacebuilding is taking place. He cites the finding of the remarkable Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding that of 336 peacebuilding projects funded by foreign and development ministries in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, 55 percent showed no commitment to a "wider country strategy of peace." Joining this insight with several others based on a holistic understanding of peacebuilding, Culbertson's essay offers a useful framework for monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding programs.

Peacebuilding can also be evaluated through moral reasoning. What is just peacebuilding? By what criteria should it be assessed? These are the questions for which my own chapter offers a framework, a set of standards analogous to those that the just war theory poses for war. Its orienting idea is reconciliation, a concept of justice as "restoration of right relationship" that is derived from the Abrahamic religious traditions and whose meaning is much like Lederach and Appleby's notion of justpeace. Animating the ethic of political reconciliation is a set of practices that aim to repair one or more wounds to human flourishing that political injustices leave behind and transform hostile emotions and judgments to ones of assent to just political orders. Reflecting the volume's axial notions, the practices are interdependent and collectively holistic.

The ensuing nine chapters explore strategic peacebuilding in particular contexts. In them can be found the range of actors, activities, and time horizons, the stress on holism and interdependence, and the proposals for linking sectors together—the strategies of peace—that characterize strategic peacebuilding. Legal scholar Simon Chesterman and Nicholas Sambanis both look at UN peacebuilding operations, stressing the need for their integration with certain other practices. Drawing from his experience observing the UN's most ambitious operations—East Timor and Kosovo—Chesterman concludes that "states cannot be made to work from the outside." International assistance can be successful, but only when it complements the creation of local institutions, policies, and practices and the efforts of local actors. The Peacebuilding Commission, he believes, carries potential for enriching such complementarity, but it is too early to judge its success.

Sambanis focuses on that aspect of UN peace operations that he and Doyle believe is most lacking: economic development. He advocates a commitment to economic reconstruction and to integrating such reconstruction into the project of peacebuilding that is far more capacious than the Washington

Consensus approach of creating free market institutions and reducing public sectors. Sambanis describes what this reconstruction consists of, how his and Doyle's peacebuilding triangle reveals the need for it, and who carries it out in his chapter.

The UN is also the focus of George A. Lopez and David Cortright's chapter—not its peace operations but its policies for countering terrorism. Widely recognized experts on sanctions, Lopez and Cortright outline a policy that vividly exemplifies strategic peacebuilding's interdependence of activity. Recognizing the connection between terrorism and good governance, economic development, and human rights, they offer informed recommendations for sanctions and other enforcement measures that enhance (not detract from) these ends. In so doing, they propose ways to combat violence while also improving the environments that incubate this violence in the first place.

Robert C. Johansen's chapter also strongly illustrates strategic peacebuilding's interdependence by exploring two pursuits whose clash begets vociferous controversy today in countries like Uganda—the prosecution of war criminals through the International Criminal Court and achieving a negotiated settlement to civil war, which some argue requires amnesty or at least forgoing trials. His approach is precisely a strategy for peace: a presumption for prosecution, but one that is pursued so as best to promote long-term peace in war-ridden societies and is potentially overridden in cases where it prevents such peace. With sophistication, he addresses the dilemmas to which his approach gives rise and proposes concrete solutions.

Legal scholar Naomi Roht-Arriaza makes the case for strategic interdependence and complementarity in another realm that is integral to building a just peace—transitional justice. As she describes, it is a realm with a trajectory toward holism all of its own, beginning with debates over whether to prosecute in Latin America in the 1980s, proceeding to the rise of robust truth commissions in Chile and South Africa in the 1990s, and now coming to involve rich “hybrids” of both trials and truth commissions, often combined with practices of vetting, reparations, and commemorations. Roht-Arriaza's piece partners with Johansen's essay on trials, then, in plumbing the other institutions involved in this complementarity. She argues that practitioners of transitional justice need to recognize another sort of holism—a linking of international, regional, national, and local transitional justice mechanisms, each of which complements the others in its strengths and weaknesses.

Like Johansen, peace scholar Larissa Fast takes up the tension between two activities that often come into conflict in the field: humanitarian relief and other dimensions of peacebuilding, like mediating an end to wars. Her response to the problem seems at first to be a dissonant one for the volume: the two activities should not be linked, she avers, lest humanitarian relief become diverted and compromised. But respecting other sectors' autonomy can be construed as a strategy for peace. Amid war, anarchy, and chaos, such respect requires intentionality, awareness, and coordination. In arguing for such a severance, Fast takes on a rival position that would link humanitarianism and politics. She explains why the case for separation is more persuasive.

Sociologist Jackie Smith challenges the liberal peace head on, especially its optimism about market economies. Like Roland Paris, she believes that a rapid push for free markets, free trade, and minimal government in the wake of armed conflict can actually destabilize societies rather than build lasting peace. Both her diagnosis and her solution to the problem exceed Paris's call for sequencing. For her, the chief obstacle to peace is local structures of inequality that are in turn embedded in global structures of inequality, which, if not addressed, will only lead to further war. What sort of strategy can combat these inequalities and hence offer hope for a sustainable peace? Her bold and surprising answer leads us far beyond the corridors of international financial institutions.

What of strategic peacebuilding's concern with changing hearts and minds? What of its emphasis on the long run? Both factors receive play in the chapter by psychologists Robert D. Enright, Jeannette Knutson Enright, and Anthony C. Holter, who draw conclusions from the curriculum for teaching forgiveness to children that they have established in the school system of Belfast, Ireland. Forgiveness contributes to peace by encouraging a new generation to turn away from communal hatred and toward civic friendship, a virtue that resembles Lederach and Appleby's notion of right relationship as well as my own concept of reconciliation. Forgiveness, civil society, affective change, the educational sector, and the long run: all of these features add new hues to strategic peacebuilding's palette.

One sort of actor in particular, one also associated with hearts, minds, and the long run, has been virtually neglected by the liberal peace: the religious. The chapter by Gerard F. Powers, an expert on international affairs in the Catholic Church, is a strong corrective. Behind the neglect of religion, he explains, is the secularization paradigm, which views religion as an irrational, violent, and intolerant force that is destined for extinction. The religious can be violent, he acknowledges, but they have also proven to be powerful, passionate, and effective agents of social and political transformation, their efforts ranging from high-level mediation to interreligious dialogue to grassroots and civil society efforts. What lies behind their influence? Under what conditions are they most successful? What can the answers to these questions teach religious peacebuilders as well as secular Western governments? These issues are at the heart of Powers's inquiry.

Finally, political scientist Oliver Richmond concludes with a chapter that synthesizes and comments on the entire volume. A prolific scholar of peacebuilding and commentator on the liberal peace, Richmond evaluates the essays and the collective argument of the project from the perspective of an engaged intellectual, employing both the tools of international relations theory and his wide experience observing peacebuilding efforts on the ground around the world.

This is strategic peacebuilding—an approach that takes up and seeks to extend the movement toward holism that peacebuilding has traveled over the past two decades. Insofar as it is sound, it is an approach that ought to be of interest to a wide variety of parties, including officials in the United Nations,

the World Bank, and other international organizations, religious leaders, NGO leaders and staff, educators, economists, activists, tribal and village leaders, international lawyers and judges, state officials in countries struggling to escape war and poverty, civil society leaders, and people living and working at the grass roots wherever peacebuilding does or should take place. But strategic peacebuilding might prove to be of interest to Western governments as well. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and European governments have experienced their most difficult foreign policy dilemmas in locales where creating a sustainable peace in the aftermath of formal war proved far more difficult than military victory itself—as noted at the beginning of this introduction, this includes the U.S. experience in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq; Germany’s in Afghanistan; and the European Union’s in Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo. To recommend a strategic, holistic approach to peacebuilding in these cases is not necessarily to approve of the wars that begat these challenges in the first place. It is only to say that aims like fighting terrorism, promoting democracy, and creating stability in sundered societies might well be pursued more profitably through adopting into policy the insights in the chapters that follow. At the time of this writing, a new president has taken office in the United States, one who promises to conduct America’s foreign policy with greater sensitivity to the character of its footprint on countries around the world. Might strategic peacebuilding prove an asset?

Apart from who is building the peace, much is at stake. The lives of thousands (even hundreds of thousands) of people, government based on human rights and accountability, the prospect of escaping abject poverty, the protection of local villages and their cultures, justice for war criminals, the healing of hatred and revenge, stability between countries and within regions, and the avoidance and alleviation of AIDS, famine, and other calamities—all depend on whether societies widen and deepen their peace or collapse back into war. Just as suffering itself is multiple and interdependent, one form begetting another, so must peacebuilding be capacious, multivalent, and strategic.

NOTES

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1. The exact number of countries that have become democracies since the “third wave” began in 1974 is not clear. In his *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), Samuel P. Huntington documents thirty transitions between 1974 and 1989. Freedom House reports that the number of “free” countries increased by thirteen from 1989 to 2004. See Freedom House Press Release, *Russia Downgraded to “Not Free”* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2004); and Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2005: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2005). Democracy theorist Larry Diamond estimates that from 1974 to 1996, between thirty-six and seventy-seven states became democracies, depending on how one counts democratization exactly. See his “Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over? An Empirical Assessment,” Working Paper no. 236, Kellogg Institute, University of Notre

Dame, March 1997. Here, I adopt an estimate from the high end of the spectrum by writing of societies that have “moved toward” democracy.

2. For descriptions of the liberal peace, see Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 40–51; Oliver Richmond, “Patterns of Peace,” *Global Society* 20, no. 4 (2006); Oliver P. Richmond, “The Problem of Peace: Understanding the ‘Liberal Peace’,” *Conflict, Security, & Development* 6, no. 3 (2006).

3. This is not to say that a wave of ethnic conflicts broke out just after the Cold War—a prevailing myth. Ethnic conflict had been increasing for several decades during the Cold War and continued to remain at a high level just after the Cold War ended. The *Human Security Report* of 1995 shows that after a high point for the entire Cold War period in 1991, struggles for self-determination (most of them ethnic or communal in nature) declined sharply up through 2004. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), xiii, 11; *The Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (Oxford: Human Security Centre, 2005).

4. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 6–7.

5. James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2003), xiv–xv.

6. Paris, *At War's End*, 17.

7. Roland Paris, “Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical versus Contemporary Studies of the Liberal Peace,” *International Studies Review* 8 (2006): 433.

8. Monica Duffy Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 6–7. Different figures, but ones yielding the same conclusion, come from Elizabeth M. Cousens and Charles T. Call. “The trend toward negotiated settlements after the Cold War also created entry points for international peacekeeping: between 1946 and 1990, twice as many conflicts ended through victory than through negotiations, whereas between 1995 and 2004, negotiated settlements were three times as likely to end war as outright victory,” they write. They add in a note that “between 1994 and 2004, out of 48 wars ended, 36 concluded with negotiation compared to victory.” See Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 9 (2008): 5.

9. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* (New York: United Nations, 2004), 33–34.

10. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 2nd ed. (New York: United Nations Publications, 1995).

11. *Ibid.*; contains the supplement.

12. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (New York: United Nations, 2000).

13. *Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

14. *A More Secure World*.

15. Paris, *At War's End*, 40–51.

16. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York: United Nations, 1996).

17. For a description, see Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century* (Surrey, U.K.: Profile Books, 2004), 20–23.

18. See, for instance, Richard Caplan, *The International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Noah Feldman, *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation-Building* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 2003); Stephen John Stedman, ed., *Ending Civil Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
19. *Human Security Report 2005*, 1–9.
20. Paris, *At War's End*, 55–58.
21. George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, “Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation,” in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Accords*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 50, 59. Call and Cousens share Downs and Stedman’s criticism of Paris and advocate a “moderate standard” of “no renewed warfare plus decent governance.” See Call and Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace,” 7.
22. Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 73, and Nicholas Sambanis’s chapter in this volume. The broad verdict of “mixed success” is shared by other systematic analyses, including Caplan, *International Governance*; James Dobbins, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2007).
23. Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 110.
24. Call and Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace,” 2.
25. *Ibid.*, 5.
26. Andrew Mack, *Global Patterns of Political Violence* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007); cited in Call and Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace,” 5.
27. Paris, *At War's End*, 179–211. See also Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000).
28. Stedman, *Ending Civil Wars*, 3.
29. Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 64.
30. Dobbins, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*.
31. Fukuyama, *State Building*, 1–57.
32. Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 2–6.
33. Donald Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder, “Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy,” in *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).
34. Even Paris, for his sharp criticism of the liberal peace, does not contest its goals. His dispute is about sequencing more than it is about what ends ought to be pursued. He even grounds his case in Enlightenment political thought, arguing that the same thinkers who generated the liberal peace also understood the importance of establishing stable government institutions. See Paris, *At War's End*, 46–51.
35. For one account of a holistic approach to peacebuilding involving the UN, see Thomas M. Franck, “A Holistic Approach to Building Peace,” in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, ed. Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
36. See William Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Caplan, *International Governance*; and Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
37. Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace*, 19, 61.

38. *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, 1, 6, 7.
39. Statement by the president of the Security Council, quoted in Call and Cousens, "Ending Wars and Building Peace," 6.
40. *A More Secure World*, 83, 84.
41. Social Development Department Sustainable Development Network, "Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors," World Bank, 2006.
42. It is important to note that alongside the present work are other analyses in which the UN, Western governments, and international institutions are not the only or even the primary actors but are situated in a world of grassroots initiatives and civil society activities, of NGOs and religious leaders, of globalized markets and their local merchants, of truth commissions and tribal rituals, of villages and metropolises, of immediate crises and long-term transformations—efforts and analyses that have initiated the idea of strategic peacebuilding. For these, see citations in John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby's chapter. See also Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Cambridge, Mass.: Collaborative for Development Action, 2003); Johannes Botes, "Conflict Transformation: A Debate over Semantics of a Crucial Shift in the Theory and Practice of Peace and Conflict Studies?" *International Journal of Peace Studies* 8, no. 2 (2003); Necla Tschirgi, *Peacebuilding as the Link between Peace and Security: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2004).
43. Call and Cousens, "Ending Wars and Building Peace," 3.
44. It should be noted that some of the authors do place a strong stress on nonviolence in the larger corpus of their writings. There is no general agreement on the issue among the present authors.
45. Botes, "Conflict Transformation."
46. See especially John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997); John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (Intercourse, Penn.: Good Books, 2003); John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995).
47. R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).