Policy Brief #1 (May 1999)

By Alan Dowty

Briefly: The 1999 Israeli elections confirm the emergence of a more centrist Israeli politics A "national unity government" emerging from the elections is a distinct possibility Though the peace process was not a major issue, the outcome will be a renewal of peace talks Deals on both the Palestinian and Syrian fronts may be closer to realization than is generally realized

   
Ehud Barak's decisive defeat of Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu in Israel's Prime Ministerial race is being greeted as a critical turning point. But isn't every Israeli election a watershed event? Only three years ago Netanyahu's narrow upset of Shimon Peres changed the entire complexion of Middle East politics. And in the election before that, in 1992, Yitzhak Rabin's victory set the stage for the 1993 breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Actually most Israeli elections before that were not so decisive. The biggest turning point was in 1977, when Israel's first right-wing government ended half a century of domination by Labor Zionist parties. But the elections of 1981, 1984, and 1988 all produced deadlock, forcing the left and the right to share power in uneasy coalitions. Initially the balance between the two blocs was held by religious parties, though as time passed these parties became increasingly identified with the right.

What has happened in the 1990s is that a centrist bloc, which had never really existed in Israeli politics, has emerged to replace religious parties as the "balancer" in the system. Immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who tend to be hawkish and anti-socialist but also strongly secular, are a key element in this new center. Now comprising between 15-20 percent of the electorate, they provided the margin of victory both for Rabin in 1992 and for Netanyahu in 1996.

To win this time Netanyahu needed at least 70 percent of the Russian vote, but fell far short of this. Barak and his "One Israel" alliance successfully played on Russian antipathies toward religious and Sephardic (Asian/African) Jews. In 1996 Netanyahu had been able to pull all of these "outside" groups into common cause against the Labor Zionist establishment.

Barak's major strategic achievement was to make Netanyahu himself into the main focus of the campaign. Aided by Israel's peculiar electoral system in which the Prime Minister is chosen in a separate personal vote, the opposition kept the spotlight focussed on "Bibi": his abrasive personality, his confrontational style. In a sense Netanyahu, who was instrumental in bringing personalized politics to Israel, died by the sword as he had lived by it. It is not surprising that he pre-empted his many enemies within his own party by stepping down as Likud leader before the attacks could begin.

This election is, indeed, a turning point. Of course it can be reversed by another turning point in three or four years, as has now happened in three successive elections. But, in the meantime, what are the implications for the peace process?

Since 1993 the Oslo peace process has consistently been supported, in principle, by a comfortable majority of 60-70 percent of the Israeli public. Netanyahu won election in 1996 only by promising to continue the peace process ("peace with security"), thus winning enough votes in the center to make, together with his rejectionist supporters, a bare majority. But consequently a majority within his own government were, in fact, opposed to the same process that Netanyahu was sworn to uphold. That a government based on this fundamental contradiction could stay in power for three years was itself a minor miracle that defies easy explanation. By the same token, its collapse last December over the Wye agreement, when hard-right rejectionists finally split from Netanyahu, was hardly a surprise.

Whatever the final composition of Barak's coalition, the new government will be more closely attuned to prevailing sentiment. The peace process will resume more or less where it stalled in November, 1995, with the assassination of Rabin (the Hebron and Wye agreements concluded by Netanyahu were, essentially, loose ends from the 1995 Interim Agreement). The basic features of a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement were already beginning to emerge at that time, in private discussions that have since been revealed. These features include a demilitarized Palestinian state in most of the West Bank and Gaza, some territorial adjustments to bring many or most Israeli settlements within Israel's borders, and a Palestinian capital on the outskirts of eastern Jerusalem.

While Netanyahu was unable to negotiate along these lines himself, given the composition of his government, his three years in office have served to legitimize the peace process among a broader segment of the Israeli public. Although the Hebron and Wye agreements did little or nothing to move things forward, they did commit large elements on the Israeli right (mainly in the Likud) to the process itself. When it comes to shaking Yasir Arafat's hand and sitting down to hard bargaining with the Palestinians, there are few left on the Israeli scene who are uncompromised in their nationalist purity.

Apart from renewing Israeli-Palestinian talks in the near future, Barak will also move relatively quickly to revive talks with Syria and Lebanon. In the first place, he committed himself during the campaign to a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the security belt in southern Lebanon within one year, and this commitment almost certainly requires conclusion of an overall deal with Syria. Such a deal would trade Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights for far-reaching demilitarization and a modicum of normalization on the Syrian side, as well as peace in Lebanon. Secondly, having the two negotiating tracks active at the same time is advantageous to Israel tactically, making it possible to play one off against the other.

To accomplish this, Barak will attempt to establish the broadest government that he can. The power enjoyed by the Prime Minister in Israel's hybrid system gives him tremendous leverage in doing this; no one else can form a government, and realistically the Knesset can force him from office only if it is willing to subject itself to new elections as well.

Given the composition of the new Knesset, Barak cannot form a government of the left and center only. He will need the support of at least one Arab party, or one religious party, or of the Likud. The LIkud option -- essentially a "national unity government" that would exclude only the far left and far right -- is not that remote a possibility. Barak will in any event pursue all options, not only for bargaining purposes, but also to acquire "superfluous" coalition partners so that no one party can threaten to bring down the government.

Alan Dowty is professor of government and international studies at the University of Notre Dame and a fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, where he has taught since 1975. Previously, he was on the faculty of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem for twelve years, during which time he also served as executive director of the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and as chairman of the Department of International Relations. He is the author of The Jewish State: A Century Later (University of California Press, 1998). He may be contacted at Alan.K.Dowty.1@nd.edu or (219) 631-5098.

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