from La Opinion, July 31, Sunday, 2005

George A. Lopez

The horrific London commuter bombings of July 7 and the July 23 lethal attacks at the Egyptian resort area of Sharma el-Sheikh serve as stark reminders of societal vulner-ability in this age of new, mass-casualty terror. There is no magic formula for how to end these attacks, or for how – in the short run - to dissuade committed jihads to end suicide bombings. But it is essential to know what will not work because it is based on wrong-headed assumptions about what drives and sustains this moment of frequent and brutal slaughter of the innocent.

To be sure, better human intelligence, greater security on mass transportation, and more leaders within the Muslim communities who condemn the killing of civilians as inconsistent with Islam are critical to effective counter-terrorism policy. We are beginning to see the emergence of each, with significant statements and actions being taken by various mainstream Muslims.

Tony Blair provided an inspirational message to his countrymen to resist the fear and discord that could result from such terror. But his call to steadfast courage has been followed by a litany of pronouncements from himself and President Bush which repeat certain myths and inaccuracies about contemporary terrorism and the ‘global war on terror’. If the west is to bring an end to this plague of political violence, these myths must be debunked.

One major myth engulfing the British and Americans has to do with what it takes to produce a committed suicide bomber. Mr. Blair, echoing a theme prevalent in US policy since its first articulation by Colin Powell, has called for Pakistan and other nations to monitor or to close the madrassas – the religious schools – because they breed these killers. Other British law-makers are calling for tighter controls on immigration and travel of Muslim clerics, intellectuals and teachers. Each of these measures might contribute at the margins, but they miss the core of what creates and motivates these killers.

As Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc. has noted in his recent study of some 75 terrorists, the madrassa provides training in reciting the Koran by rote in Arabic. The logistical, technical and other skills needed to terrorize come from elsewhere and has little to do with religion. The British bombers who had traveled to Pakistan learned how to build their bombs from ‘experts’ living in that nation. No matter what religious fervor they may have learned at the madrassa, these criminals would be incapable of killing without the materials and the methods provided them elsewhere. And such training happened quickly in a communal and political system with low regard for the west, in relative secret, and in a nation where criminal investigation and intelligence networks have failed to root out terrorists.

Secondly, Robert Pape of the University of Chicago, has shown that a number of the working assumptions of policy makers about suicide bombers are incorrect. These attackers are continually portrayed as Islamic fundamentalists with no real political motivation beyond hating the western way of life. In analyzing 315 suicide bombings between 1980 and 2003, Pape has found these to have the pronounced, secular goal of forcing occupying forces to withdraw from their homeland. And in Sri Lanka, Palestine and now Iraq these suicide killers are part of a larger, more complex range of militant resistance. What is most scary about the London and Egyptian bombings – and Madrid before these - is that each nation is a relatively low level player in Iraq, and they were bombed in their own capital cities. But this has not been the norm.

These poor understandings about individual terrorists are sustained by the two central myths of larger US-British policy since the 9-11 attacks. The first claims that in taking the war on terror to toppling governments in Afghanistan and Iraq that al-Qaeda leadership is decimated and on the run. The second states that ‘we are fighting the terrorists over there in order to prevent attacks here’.

The London bombings – which we in the US know could have happened in New York or Los Angeles - confirm that the Bush-Blair strategy for combating terrorism through war and extended military involvements of essentially unilateral action is failing. The Egyptian attacks illustrate that the targets are not western democracies. Recent studies confirm that there have been twice as many significant attacks carried out by jihadists after 9-11as there were in the three years before that terrible day.

Although a number of mid-level leaders of al-Qaeda proper have been captured or killed, overall jihadist cell leadership and new members have increased, mostly fueled by ventures such as the Iraq war. A recent CIA report notes that Iraq has become an all too useful training ground for urban terrorists. A very different report from the Century Foundation entitled Defeating the Jihadists, noted that the Iraq war “made friendly Muslims into skeptics, made skeptics into radicals, and created a sanctuary for itinerant jihadist insurgents.” And this is happening in a most pronounced manner in Europe where decades of inability or unwillingness to integrate pockets of Muslims into mainstream culture has contributed to this radicalism.

The events of this month beg for a reassessment of counter-terrorism policy from top to bottom so that we no longer fall victim to myths which sustain ineffective policy. Two arenas for change – one local, another global - could prove significant. First, Mr. Blair and other European leaders need to stimulate ways in which local communities engage the full spectrum of Muslim dialogue that needs to unfold within Islam itself. Thus, to his credit, and different from policies operative in the US, Britain has not banned the entry of serious interlocutors like the public intellectual Tariq Ramadan. Such exclusionary policies play to narrow ideologues who claim to support moderate Muslims, but can seldom permit such a person a platform for expressing their ideas. Only the exchange and engagement of ideas directly in the multi-national and multi-cultural West will triumph over terrorism.

Secondly, the momentum of response to this global terrorism must shift back to multilateral cooperation, most probably under United Nations auspices. In the quest to protect and secure ‘the homeland’ as completely as possible, both the Brits and the Americans run the risk of forgetting that global problems like terrorism require global solutions. The potential for UN success is as true now as it was in the bleak days of airline hijacking in the late 1960s, when the UN sparked a series of treaties and practices led states to greater coordination and compliance. Even amidst the deep divisions of the Cold War, nations did deter diplomatic assassinations and airline terrorism.

To reinvigorate the capturing of terrorist monies, and to thwart the movement of persons and material that sustains these transnational criminals, the two key Security Council members must provide new direction and cooperation in that body. Hints of British and American willingness to take the lead appeared in the Council debate last week in remarks made by Nicholas Rostow, general counsel to the U.S. mission, and Britain's U.N. ambassador, Emyr Jones-Parry.

Working on the hard realities of combating terrorism within a UN framework will be substantially more successful for the US and the British then endorsing myths that may make us feel better, but which actually make us no more secure.

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George A. Lopez is Senior Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

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