Published in La Opinion 12/12/04
George A. Lopez

Last spring, a number of neoconservatives attacked United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and then the UN itself for mismanagement and corruption in running the Oil- for-Food Program in Iraq from 1996-2003. When CIA weapons hunter Charles Duelfer issued his report to Congress in October, he focused attention on records discovered which supposedly showed that Saddam Hussein skimmed billions of dollars off the top of the Oil for Food Program. This steady litany of accusations culminated early last week with a call by Senator Norm Coleman of Minnesota for the resignation of the UN leader because of the level of corruption which occurred under his watch.

Fortunately, in reaction to Coleman, serious members of the press have begun to push back against the rising tide of questionable charges and to react strongly against the neocon hype and its loaded political agenda. It is no secret that Administration supporters have wanted to punish Kofi Annan for his disapproval of the war in Iraq. Annans tough questioning of the wisdom of the recent assault on Falluja was especially infuriating to the neocons.

The defense of Mr. Annan mounted by the L.A. Times, Financial Times and the New York Times underscored two fundamental realities which undercut many of the charges levied against the Secretary General. First, the responsibility for overseeing the Oil-for-Food Program from its highest policy level to its minutest detail rested exclusively with the Security Council, not the Secretary-General. Secondly, the Volcker Commission is in the midst of its confidential and deliberative investigation of the Program and of those who may have engaged in illegal activity. As with a grand jury at the domestic level, trying and condemning individuals in the press before the jury reports is idle and in this case vicious speculation. These arguments proved sufficiently convincing that Secretary of State Powell, and both President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, distanced themselves from Coleman’s remarks.

Despite this welcome clarity regarding the charges against the Secretary General, this probably completes only phase one of the neocon assault on Annan and the UN. Three particular accusations linger and are likely to be exploited by these UN foes. The first claims that Saddam smuggled millions through the United Nations system from the start of the process. Secondly, the highly secretive nature of the work of the Oil-for-Food Program aided Saddam’s ability to corrupt the program and defraud the UN. Finally, there is an incompetence and mismanagement charge against the Secretary General which claims that he simply lost control of a system gone awry after the expansion of Oil-for-Food in 2000.

From their inception in 1990, the tightly construed oil sanctions had a consciously tolerated leak. This came in the form of illicit sale of Iraqi oil to Jordan, and later some to Turkey and Syria as well. From this smuggling the Hussein government made millions of dollars. The Security Councils 661 Sanctions Committee for Iraq knew of this smuggling and tolerated its development as an indirect way to compensate Jordan for revenue loses incurred from being a steadfast member of the coalition of states committed to denying Iraq trade and arms. This leakage was so structured into the sanctions system that from 1994 to 2003 both the Clinton and Bush Administrations submitted waivers to the US Congress blocking any legislative secondary sanctions that might be imposed.

Another critique asserts that the entire Oil-for-Food operation was so secretive that it was ripe for corruption and fraud. But in fact, both the Secretariat and the Security Council were so concerned about transparent handling of Iraqi resources that the Office of the Iraq (OIP) Program website may have been the largest of any single agency working in conjunction with the Security Council. The OIP site contained every distribution plan for every phase of the oil contracting that occurred under the program. Also posted were the Secretary Generals reports, published every 90 days for the six year duration of the program. This report covered nearly every detail of the program, including a sector analysis of how distribution of aid was proceeding in the health, water, and education sectors. There was also data on site distributions for food and medicine in order to verify that the money was being used correctly. Further, there were various charts on the website which showed contracts awarded in every six month phase. Thus, there was no shortage of information and certainly no absence of transparency in either the Oil-for -Food program or the Secretariat.

A particular focus for the attackers has been on the secret oil voucher system. As the recent research of Joy Gordon of Fairfield University has shown, the voucher system was a bookkeeping device by which the Security Council would keep track of how Iraq chose its trading partners. In fact, this willingness to allow Iraq to choose its own partners was a Security Council decision, not a successful attempt by Saddam to evade the detection or constraints of the system.

In fact, the recently released list of actual oil contracts that were granted by the Iraqis to other nations mirrors this voucher list almost exactly. Thus, it was the rare transaction that took place outside the rubric of the program; nearly every oil contract that was approved by the program appears on the voucher list. It was not the role of the Secretariat to approve oil contracts. Rather, this was the sole prerogative of the Security Councils 661 Iraq Sanctions committee.

Finally, much has been made of the fact that as the Oil-for-Food program expanded dramatically in 2000, Saddam’s deception of the system through oil price manipulation meant he garnered billions in kickbacks and surcharges. While it is true that Saddam derived billions from these practices, he did not deceive for long. On three different occasions in the fall of 2000, the oil overseers, that is, UN staff of the OIP and thus indirectly working for the Secretary-General, reported to the 661 Committee these pricing irregularities. At no point did the US, or any other Council member, block these price-inflated sales.

It is essential for the Volcker commission to detail those abuses it may find in this Program. Certainly any individuals responsible for corruption should be brought to justice. But it also is critical to the future of the UN and to responsible US leadership in that organization that the investigation proceed without verbal lynching based on shoddy claims. As often occurs during partisan, personalized attacks, a few fundamental truths are lost in the cross-fire. In this case we should redirect popular attention to two central facts about the Oil-For-Food Program and the wider sanctions regime of which it was a part. First, the sanctions worked. They denied Iraq the weapons, parts, money and experts it needed to reconstitute its deadly weapons systems. Secondly, the Program fulfilled its mission to reverse the humanitarian crisis brought about by those sanctions. Most notably, under this program, child malnutrition rates were halved in most of the country in four years. These should be the enduring lessons of the Oil-for-Food Program.

George A. Lopez is Senior Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Top of Page

Home > In the News > Kroc faculty commentaries > Fighting Back for the UN